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Abstract
This thesis discusses the theory of long-term discount rates for evaluation of long-
term public projects. While there are many public projects with a distant time
horizon, the threat of global climate change has vastly stimulated economic research
and debate on the socially efficient discount rate for such applications. Due to ab-
sence of efficient interest rate markets with distant maturities, the work in progress
is heavily relying on the sophistication of economic theory. I present the essence of
the debate following the Stern review centered around the so-called Ramsey-rule,
by which I depart from to investigate the recent development on declining discount
rates that incorporates risk and uncertainty of the future. I hope to clarify some of
the basis upon which arguments are held in the literature.
2Preface
The process leading to this product began with a lot of reading of academic papers,
vast amount of information to take in, and too many interesting topics to study.
The scope of this thesis was formed continously as I was reading more and more
papers, and repetitively discussing with my supervisor. At the time I actually began
to write, I thought the topic and my focus were more or less settled, as well as the
main conclusions. In retrospect, I am quite sure that the writing itself was the most
important learning process. While I was dwelling on many topics, and having a need
to be sure of the outcome of the thesis before starting to write, I have now learned
that having faith in the process of writing is the most efficent way of organizing
findings from the literature. I guess the road is made by walking.
This is a theoretical report. Naturally, I have focused on analyzing theoretical
models. I present models from selected literature and try to explain the intuition
and the way in which they are different. I think this is necessary for, and really
a part of, the discussion itself. Of course, what really makes theoretical analysis
interesting is when it matters for practical purposes. In this report, I try to perform
a balancing of derivations and discussions, and I hope the reader finds it interesting
in the sense that it seems to matter for economic policy.
I would like to express my gratitude for the valuable comments and directional
guiding of my supervisor, prof. K˚are P. Hagen, who showed great flexibility of his
own time at the final stage of completion. I owe thanks to my brother Vegard
Nilsen, who kindly examined some of my calculations and gave helpful comments.
I am grateful for all the help of my good friend Kristoffer Thoner, who taught me
the basics of LATEX-programming as willingly as he helped improving my English
writing. Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my dear Elisabeth, who
patiently encouraged me from the beginning as well as during times of intense
work.
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Part 1
Introduction
This part motivates the focus on long-term socially efficient discount rates and
clarifies the scope of this thesis. As an introduction to subsequent parts, I present
three general rationales for discounting and the common model for use in dynamic
analysis is derived. A simple decision criterion (the NPV-rule) is illustrated and
linked to the Ramsey model at the end of this part.
1.1 Motivation
The theory of discounting the future in public cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has
attracted economists‘ attention for many decades, gaining its renaissance alongside
the popularization of global warming issues. Great effort has been put into deriving
socially efficient discount rates from sophisticated theory, as a contrast to merely
studying interest rates in the market. While there may be a handful of reasons for
failures of this market, including taxation of capital and liquidity constraints, the
theory investigated here is mostly motivated by the fact that interest rate markets
for distant horizons barely exist. The most important reason for this is future
generations‘ lack of representation in today‘s market. Even though some traded
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bonds with maturities up to 50 and a few up to 100 years are not uncommon1,
these markets have hardly been regarded as efficient2.
Public projects having an economic feature in horizons for which there doesn‘t
exist an efficient interest rate market are many, including long-lived infrastructure,
pension and health reforms, medical research, education and research in general,
biodiversity, nuclear power plants and mitigation of climate change. The applica-
tions of long-term socially efficient discount rates are many and so are the different
practices of governments. Table 1 is an illustration of some governments‘ recom-
mendations:
Nation t(years) ≤ 30 t ≥ 30 Comments
Australia - - no rules of thumb
France 4% 2% -
Norway 4% 4% up to 6% risky projects
USA 7% - est. pre-tax return private capital
Nation t ≤ 30 t ∈ [31, 75] t ∈ [76, 125] t ∈ [126, 200] t ∈ [201, 300] t ≥ 301
GB 3.5% 3% 2.5% 2% 1.5% 1%
Table 1. Governments‘ recommended discount rates3
Both France and Great Britain recommend a lower future discount rate to reflect
uncertainty about the future. Great Britain uses the steady state Ramsey equation4
δ+θg = 0.015+1 ·0.02 to justify 3.5% in the near future. Norway has estimated the
risk free real rate to be around 2 %, and rounds up to 4 % for public projects with
normal risk. Australia does not recommend specific numbers, but prescribes the
far most flexible discount rate adapted to the specific project‘s properties and cir-
1There are even a few examples of 1,000-year bonds, (the Canadian Pacific Corporation has
issued such bonds in the past) and bonds without maturity (Investopedia). The British govern-
ment has issued bonds which make coupon payments indefinitely, called Consolidated Annuities
(Encyclopedia Britannica).
2Conventional economics will regard 30 years as a maximum time horizon for liquid capital
asset markets.
3(Commonwealth of Australia, 2006), (Rapport Lebe´gue, 2005), (Finansdepartementet, 2005),
(Office of Management and Budget, 1992), (HM Treasury, 2003).
4See section 1.4 for an explanation of this.
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cumstances. Both Australia and the United States argue that the so-called shadow
price of capital method should be used5 on theoretical justification. The United
States recommends a pre-tax opportunity cost of capital of 7% for operational use
in general.
The timeliness of discounting issues comes from the increasing awareness of
anthropogenic climate change, and the arising attention for economic research on
climate change. No doubt have these overwhelming threats to our planet fostered a
whole new wave of publications on issues directly or indirectly related to discounting.
Still, it is hard to see that researchers are moving towards some kind of convergence
on prescriptions for which discount rate to use, or even the shape of the term
structure. The meta-analysis performed by Weitzman (2001) is one indicator6: He
received 2,160 numerical answers from PhD-level economists from 48 countries to
the ”simple” question of which discount rate to use in cost-benefit analysis. The
answers were ranging from -3 to 27 % with three-digit number of responses in the
range of 1 to 6 %.
There are most certainly large caveats to overcome on the whole range of top-
ics related to the economics of climate change, not at least on the dynamics of
the global warming control system itself. Still, since the publication of the Stern
Review (Stern and Treasury, 2007), it seems that most of the debate has centered
around prescriptive analysis of the discount rate. If the widespread disagreements
on this weren‘t clear prior to the publication, the aftermath of the Stern Review
effectively illustrated how inconclusive the literature on long-term discounting as a
whole stands today:
”They [Questions of discounting] lie at the heart of the Review‘s [The Stern review]
radical view of the grave damages from climate change and the need for immediate
steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions sharply”(Nordhaus, 2007)
5The shadow price of capital is defined as the present value of consumption produced by one
unit of capital (Arrow et al., 1996). It is widely held that the shadow price is difficult to estimate,
and it varies among projects in general.
6A problem of this simplistic approach, in which respondents were likely to exhibit personal
ethical values as well, is that they were not allowed to specify assumptions or state the framework
under operation.
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”The strong, immediate action on climate change advocated by the authors [of the
Stern review] is an implication of their views on intergenerational equity; it isn‘t
driven so much by the new climatic facts the authors have stressed”(Dasgupta,
2007)
”In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that the biggest uncertainty of all in the
economics of climate change is the uncertainty about which interest rate to use for
discounting.”(Weitzman, 2007)
”In reaction to those conclusions [of the Stern Review], the most widely debated
economic issue was the choice of discount rate.”(Gollier and Weitzman, 2010)
The importance of the discount rate in determining profitability of public projects
is easily illustrated by a numerical example. By the power of compounding, the
present value of $1 to be received 100 years from now with a 1 % discount rate is
$0.368, while it is $0.0025 with a 6 % discount rate, the former being 147 times
higher than the latter. Adding to disagreements on which discount rate to use, the
shape of the term structure is also subject to debate, as we will see.
Thus, in a field of economics where applications are many, as well as disagree-
ments within both academia and practice; the discount rate used is also often the
most crucial factor in determining the economic value of public projects.
1.2 The Scope and Limitations of This Thesis
Suppose that a decision-maker evaluating a long-term public project finds himself
wondering how to compare net benefits at different points of time. He asks: ”What
is the theoretical foundation for long-term discounting? What are the most impor-
tant questions concerning ethics in this theory? Why should discount rates vary
with the time horizon, and is that an issue of time inconsistency?”
This thesis is an attempt to answer these questions by collecting and discussing
insights from selected literature.
Part 2 will very briefly look into the academic debate within the conventional
framework of exponential discounting following the Stern Review. In addition to
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the Stern Review‘s circumspect discussion of discounting issues, there already exists
an excellent, and complete at the time, review on discounting and intergenerational
equity by Arrow et al. (1996)7. I will not replicate this work, or even try to reach
up to the level of their extensive treatment. But in acknowledging the need to
outline central issues of disagreement before investigating the recent progress of
non-exponential discounting, I think the academic debate deserves to be dedicated
a small part of this thesis. The presentation of the debate will be structured around
the steady state Ramsey equation, which I derive in section 1.4. Part 2 is more of a
sentimental analysis of how different philosophical views work through the Ramsey
model. The advantage of an economic framework applied to philosophical questions,
is in its ability to structure implications of ethical values for policy analysis and vice
versa.
Part 3 is the main part of this thesis. I thoroughly follow the reader through the
different rationales for using declining discount rates in long-term public CBA. De-
clining discount rates are not to be confused with hyperbolic preferences (sometimes
also referred to as hyperbolic discounting). Hyperbolic preferences is a well-studied
field within the behavioral theory of individual intertemporal decision-making, flour-
ishing with the work of Strotz (1955) who pointed to the problems of time incon-
sistency. The theory of hyperbolic preferences deals with discounting of utility.
Declining discount rates describe an optimal term structure for discounting public
projects. The theory is based on external factors to the agent and deals with dis-
counting of goods. This important distinction will be made clear in part 3, as well
as implications for time inconsistency. As we will see, the literature is not yet fully
developed on this particular issue.
In part 4, I summarize my reflections and conclude the main insights I draw
from the investigated literature. I mention a few of the major caveats in long-term
project evaluation that relates to the discount rate but falls short of the scope of
this thesis.
Throughout the thesis I will not look at effects of the intrinsic risks of projects
7As well as the collection of essays on discounting and intergenerational equity edited by Port-
ney and Weyant (1999).
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on discount rates. Rather, my focus is on effects of introducing risk and uncertainty
of the macroeconomic conditions in the future. These future macroeconomic condi-
tions are captured either in the consumption growth or the interest rate, and these
are dual to each other in an equilibrium framework.
It is commonly held that project risk should be adjusted for by using certainty-
equivalent costs and benefits, when these accrue asymmetrically over time8. The dis-
count rate is then left to reflect opportunity costs of time, not riskiness of projects.
This would be a risk-free interest rate with regard to the project, but risks of future
consumption growth, or risks of the future risk-free interest rate will affect this dis-
count rate in general. The macroeconomic risk comes from not knowing what our
real economic situation, and hence our marginal utility will be in the future. This
kind of risk will be introduced and analyzed in part 3, and is at the heart of the
theory of declining discount rates.
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is explained by the degree of knowl-
edge about the stochastic process. If we know the parameters of such a process for
sure, we are left with pure risks of nature. If we don‘t know the parameters for sure,
we are dealing with parametric uncertainty. Throwing a fair dice is a good example
of a pure risk environment, while real developments of macroeconomic conditions
in a strict sense always is bound to contain some varying degree of parametric
uncertainty, like for instance throwing a dice with unknown probabilities.
As always, real economic values and not nominal values matter for public CBA.
Therefore, if not stated, I mean real values.
I must point to the review performed by Pearce et al. (2003), since this work
aspires to review the recent progress in social discounting and the theory of declin-
ing discount rates. My thesis differs in at least three ways: It is not a review per
se, but rather a kind of textbook-approach. Therefore, I also perform an explicit
investigation of the rationale behind long-term discounting. Lastly, I focus more ex-
tensively on the timing issues that arises from a declining term structure and aspire
8Weitzman (2007) looks at a combined framework treating project risks of climate change
mitigation directly in the discount rate and obtains a declining pattern of discount rates. See
section 4.3.
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to conclude on these issues9. An additional review by Gollier et al. (2008) investi-
gates declining discount rates and focuses, to a large extent, on transforming the
theory into operational prescriptions. I will refrain from leaving the environment of
abstract economic theory in part 3, and devote more attention to the timing issues,
in addition to investigate the whole range of rationales behind declining discount
rates. This thesis is purely theoretical and will not try to implicate numerical an-
swers to the question of a socially efficient discount rate. I have accordingly made
many simplifying assumptions, and overlooked the many caveats appearing when
operationalizing public CBA for real applications. In this way, I also think my work
differs from the reviews mentioned.
The rest of part 1 will shortly discuss some basic features of discounting, and
the last section entails a ”back of the envelope”-derivation of the Ramsey model.
The end of part 1 contains a few remarks on the Ramsey model and public CBA.
Further assumptions are stated when needed.
1.3 About the Discount Rate
Here I will shortly answer the question: Why do economic agents discount the
future at all? In the theory, there are three main reasons for discounting10.
Impatience
On the individual level there is a well-documented tendency to put lower weight on
the future simply because we prefer utility today versus tomorrow, ceteris paribus.
This is called the pure rate of time preference or the impatience rate, and is gener-
ally applied to discounting of utility rather than consumption goods. The tendency
to be impatient is observed among animals as well as human beings, having fea-
tures of animal spirits. This behavior might reveal instincts, biologically explained
by survival propensities11 or could be explained by other external factors driving
9In those ways I also believe that my work differs from OXERA (2002).
10As stated in the previous section, I don‘t look at individual project risks.
11The observed impatience have been studied among economists, as well as biologists, psychol-
ogists and philosophers.
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uncertainty about the future, or even uncertainty about own preferences in the fu-
ture12. Hence, on both the individual and collective level we might interpret the
impatience rate as a tragedy rate or extinction rate. Such an interpretation implies
that the exponential discount rate reflects the probability of a tragedy or extinction
per instant of time. Whether this impatience rate applies to social discounting or
not is discussed briefly in part 2.
Opportunity Cost of Capital
As long as there is productive technology, there is a cost of not putting the capital
into its best alternative use. To forgo the benchmark investment is an opportunity
cost and hence any project under evaluation is required to yield at least as high
return on capital as the marginal return on capital. This is true for the individual
as well as the society in general 13. This is a discounting rate that applies to
discounting of consumption goods rather than utility.
Technological Progress and Decreasing Marginal Utility
If there is technological progress, or on the individual level some other reason that
income grows over time, transferring consumption from today and into the future
should be discounted because of decreasing marginal utility of consumption. The
simple intuition is that in the future we are on a higher consumption level, and
by decreasing marginal utility14, the marginal utility of one unit of consumption is
lower compared to that of one unit of consumption invested today. Hence, there is
a utility loss of transferring consumption into the richer future.
12One extensive review of theory and empirics on the impatience rates is the meta-analysis of
Frederick et al. (2002).
13The historical marginal return on capital is elicited from the financial markets, or estimated
directly from the return on real capital.
14In fact, this rationale for discounting falls apart if we assume linear utility.
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1.4 The Ramsey Model
Much of the debate on long-term discounting, especially post-Stern, is centered
around a formal model describing dynamic optimal planning of consumption. The
framework has its origin in the seminal paper A Mathematical Theory on Saving
by Ramsey (1928). The model has evolved through new mathematical methods
and many bright economic scholars15, but I will nevertheless call it the Ramsey
Model. Before we look into the problems of this kind of modelling and the debate
that follows, I believe it is useful to explicitly derive its assumptions and state the
results, rather than just take the Ramsey equation at face value. The presentation
of this model is based on the textbook on economic growth by Barro and Sala-i
Martin (2004). For an almost complete derivation of the model, I refer to appendix
A, which is recommended to the reader who is unfamiliar with the model.
Simplifying Assumptions
1. The world is assumed to be completely predictable and free of risk!
2. There is one optimizing representative agent, and problems of aggregating
agents‘ utility across space and time are ignored.
3. The representative agent has power utility, which gives constant relative risk
aversion(θ) and satisfies the general criteria: u′(c) > 0 , u′′(c) < 0 and Inada
conditions: limc→0 u′(c) =∞ , limc→∞ u′(c) = 0
4. The representative agent works at equilibrium wage, W (t), and has initial
endowment A(0). Total capital income is r(t)A(t)
5. There is one representative consumption good: C(t)
6. Population is equal to the labor force and is normalized to 1 at time 0 and
has relative growth n such that: L(t) = ent
7. Technology is normalized to 1 at date 0 and has relative growth g such that:
G(t) = egt
15Especially economists Robert M. Solow, Tjalling Koopmans and David Cass.
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8. A positive impatience rate is assumed, δ > 0 if not for other reasons to get
bounded lifetime utility.
9. Y = F (K, Lˆ), where Lˆ = L(t)G(t) denotes effective labor force. K denotes
total capital stock, and we will introduce the variables k = K
L
meaning capital
per capita, kˆ = K
Lˆ
which denotes capital per effective capita, and
˙ˆ
k, which
denotes the time derivative of kˆ. We use equivalent notation for C(t), c, cˆ
and ˙ˆc which denotes consumption per capita and so on. In practice, this
means that over time, these variables are ”depreciated” with technology and
population growth. Cobb-Douglas production technology is assumed for its
convenient properties. That is, we want the production function to satisfy
constant returns to scale in both arguments and Inada conditions.
10. All markets clear at all points of time, one unit of labor W(t) is inelastically
supplied per capita. Depreciation is assumed to be zero, so the rental rate of
capital is r(t), and frictionless markets provide the same rate for borrowing
and lending.
The Consumers‘ Problem
Consumption c is generalized to include all goods, abstract, physical, health and
environmental goods and so on. The instantaneous utility function
u(c) =
c1−θ−1
1−θ , θ > 1 (1.1)
θ = 1 =⇒ u(c) = ln(c) (1.2)
lim
θ→1
u(c)
l’Hopital
= lim
θ→1
(−θln(c)
−1
)
(1.3)
= ln(c) (1.4)
The objective is to maximize lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
u[c(t)]e−(δ−n)dt, (1.5)
subject to the constraint in dynamics of income:
a˙ = w(t)− c(t)− a(t)(n− r(t)) (1.6)
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,and the transversality condition, where v(t) denotes the present value shadow price
of income:
lim
t→∞
(v(t) · a(t)) = 0 (1.7)
The transversality condition‘s intuition is best explained if one imagines a thought
”end of time”. At that time, it is not optimal having consumed all resources, and
the credit markets don‘t allow any negative values on assets. The formulation of
the problem will ensure this. The Hamiltonian16:
H = u[c(t)]e−(δ−n)t + v(t)
(
w(t)− c(t)− a(t)(n− r(t))) (1.8)
In appendix A.1, I solve for these first-order condition and substitute the general
utility function for power utility:
∂H
∂c
= 0
−∂H
∂a
= v˙
 FOC (1.9)
Euler Equation
According to the model we are now to end up with the famous Euler equation,
governing the optimal path of per capita consumption at any time t.
Euler equation:
c˙
c
=
1
θ
(r − δ) (1.10)
Here it is important to note that this equation describes the optimal path of con-
sumption per capita regardless of steady state.
The Firms‘ Problem
Capital K is generalized to include all forms of capital except human capital which
is treated directly as labor-augmenting technology. Assuming that firms optimize
profits each instant of time,
pi = F [K,L]− rK − wL (1.11)
16A good source to learn the intuition of this mathematical tool is Dixit (1990).
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Optimization gives the first-order conditions:
∂pi
∂K
= 0
f ′(kˆ) = r
 FOC capital (1.12)
∂pi
∂L
= 0
egt
(
f(kˆ)− f ′(kˆ)kˆ
)
= w
 FOC labor (1.13)
Equilibrium Optimal Dynamics
The dynamics of capital per effective labor:
˙ˆ
k = f(kˆ)− cˆ− kˆ(n+ g) (1.14)
The relative consumption growth per effective labor (Euler equation)
˙ˆc
cˆ
=
1
θ
(
f ′(kˆ)− δ − θg
)
(1.15)
This is the Euler equation in per effective capita form. Rearranging, we arrive at
the Ramsey equation in per effective capita form:
f ′(kˆ) = δ + θ
(
g +
˙ˆc
cˆ
)
(1.16)
The Steady State Ramsey Equation
By imposing steady state, ˙ˆc =
˙ˆ
k = 0, we arrive at the very important steady state
Ramsey equation (s.s. Ramsey equation):
f ′(kˆ) = δ + θg (1.17)
Note that this equation in general doesn‘t hold until reaching steady state. This
equation is often used in debates about long-term discounting, and I think it is
important to have in mind that it relies on the economy having arrived at steady
state.
We know that in our model, firms simply adjust investments such that (f ′(kˆ) =
r) the marginal product is equal to the interest rate at every instant of time. Along
the optimal consumption path, this interest rate will vary given concavity of f(kˆ),
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but we could say something about the interest rate in steady state of the economy in
this model. As shown, the only source of consumption growth per capita in steady
state is the technological process.
The rule for optimal consumption growth has now been translated into a socially
efficient discount rate, with infinite time horizon given that the economy is in steady
state. The right hand side of eq. (1.17) is often called the social rate of time
preference (SRTP), because the right hand side is derived on the basis of society‘s
dynamic preferences. That is:
SRTP = δ + θg (1.18)
1.5 The Ramsey Model and CBA
Now that we have described the underlying assumptions and forces governing opti-
mal consumption growth, we are able to say something about the implications for
normative analysis in the field of public CBA. Before we proceed we need to specify
the decision criterion.
1.5.1 The NPV-Criterion
I am not considering project risks but the NPV-criterion is generalized using cer-
tainty equivalent costs and benefits. Define
Ct = certainty equivalent costs at time t (1.19)
Bt = certainty equivalent benefits at time t (1.20)
It = investment required at time t to undertake a project (1.21)
kt = the socially efficient discount rate at time t (1.22)
Then, we can define
NPVt =
∫ ∞
t
(Bv − Cv)e−kvvdv − It ≥ 0 (1.23)
The criterion requires that the net present value of the project is positive. If the
constraint on capital availability is not binding, all projects with positive NPV
should be undertaken.
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Note that costs and benefits are defined in equivalent measures. Usually, benefits
in terms of social utility is converted into consumption equivalents, as with costs
and investments.
Even though the upper limit is ∞ in the above integral, it is assumed that the
integral is bounded17.
Define pit = profits at time t on the marginal private project and r = return on
the marginal project. Then, by accounting relationship,∫ ∞
t
pive
−rvdv − It = 0 (1.24)
This is highly trivial and simply illustrates that the marginal private project has
return equal to the marginal rate of return in the economy.
1.5.2 Conclusions
In practice, the observed marginal return on capital is different from the estimated
social rate of time preference, as defined by eq. (1.18).
In order to say something about public CBA when we are not in steady state,
define:
From the general Ramsey eq.:
f ′(kˆ) = δ + θ
(
g +
˙˙c
cˆ
)
= ρg (1.25)
From the s.s. Ramsey eq.:
f ′(kˆ) = δ + θ · g = ρss (1.26)
From frictionless markets:
r = f ′(kˆ) (1.27)
Proposition 1.1
Trivially, if the real world economy were a Ramsey economy in steady state, we could
simply apply the observed market interest rate for CBA. This means that ρss = r
17We assume that the discount rate is positive and net benefits are increasing sufficiently slowly.
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Suppose a new public project is under evaluation. If the project survives the NPV-
rule with r, the marginal loss of utility from reducing consumption today is at least
offset by the marginal increase in present value of utility in the future, taking into
account that marginal utility is lower in the future.
Proposition 1.2
If we were to observe the right hand side of the s.s. Ramsey equation as well as the
frictionless market interest rate, and find that r 6= ρss, then we are not in steady
state, and cannot apply ρss as a discount rate in general.
In deriving the Ramsey model, we have seen that r = ρss is a necessary, though
not sufficient condition for steady state. If we are not in steady state, we need the
general Ramsey equation to know if we are moving along the optimal path. That
is, if eq. (1.25) holds.
Proposition 1.3
If we were to observe all the parameters on the left and right hand side of the general
Ramsey equation, and find inequality, we should adjust the path of consumption in
order to get equality, and hence, achieve the optimal path.
The optimal change of relative consumption growth is given by the Euler equa-
tion. This will be achieved by investing or disinvesting in the economy. Adjusting
investments will in response change kˆ, and in turn f ′(kˆ).
Proposition 1.4
If r > ρg the Euler equation states that we should invest by reducing consumption
today in order to get equality and again move along the optimal path. The socially
efficient discount rate will then be r.
We should always invest in the most profitable project first.
Proposition 1.5
If r < ρg the Euler equation states that we should disinvest by increasing consump-
tion today in order to get equality and again move along the optimal path. The
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socially efficient discount rate will then be ρg.
If we use the market interest rate as a discount rate, we will not be sure of com-
pensating the decreasing marginal utility effect and the impatience rate effect.
Part 2
Background: The Academic
Debate
This part discusses some selected topics of the debate raised by the Stern Review.
It will not discuss the Stern Review itself, but rather look at the publications in
response and occasionally draw on earlier publications. The topics of the Stern
Review debate are not particularly new to academia, but the conclusions relying on
these topics and assumptions are very much controversial. The discount rate part of
the climate change debate is important for public projects in general as well as for
green projects. But if the project under evaluation seeks to limit the probability or
consequences of a possible catastrophe, the rate of return hardly matter the most1.
The main point of this part is the difficulty of applying the s.s. Ramsey equation
in a way meeting consensus in academia, even when economic growth is taken to
be deterministic. There are, as I see it, three important reasons for this:
1. There is no general consensus that the s.s. Ramsey equation is a good formula
for discount rates in real world applications, especially when opportunity cost
of capital is higher than the social rate of time preference.
2. There are large uncertainties on estimates of the parameters (δ) pure rate of
time preference and (θ) elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
1See section 4.3 for a short discussion of this.
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3. There are huge disagreements regarding ethical values, and how to assess such
values for normative applications.
The first point here was partly made in part 1 of the thesis. It will be somewhat
elaborated in section 2.1.2. The second point is demonstrated in Table 2 here, as
well as discussed shortly in section 2.1.1: The third point is the subject of section
2.2.
Authors E[θ] Range of E[θ]
Stern(1977) 2 [0,10]
Hall (1988) 10 -
Epstein & Zin (1991) - [1.25,5]
Pearce & Ulph (1995) - [0.7,1.5]
Table 2. Estimates of θ 2
Frederick et al. (2002) present a long list of different estimates of δ, varying from
negative values to more than 100 %. The estimates are as many as the methods
used in the empirical literature, and suggest that individuals‘ δ varies with different
situations.
2.1 Repercussions of the Stern Review
The importance of the Stern Review in the academic debate on climate change
extends to a whole range of topics. With its 2,904 citations (according to Google
Scholar), it has certainly served as a benchmark for the climate change debate.
I will however limit myself to concentrate on the debate induced by controversial
discounting. Alongside introducing insurance arguments for using a low discount
rate, Stern and Treasury (2007) uses the framework of the s.s. Ramsey Model to
rationalize a discount rate of 1.4%. He argues that there are good reasons to believe
that δ = 0.001, θ = 1, and g = 0.013 resulting into
2The information in the table is obtained from Gollier (unpublished manuscript), ”Pricing the
future: The economics of discounting and sustainable development”, an unpublished work by prof.
Christian Gollier at Toulouse School of Economics, France.
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ρ = δ + θg = 0.001 + 1 · 0.013 = 1.4% (2.1)
Note that δ was set solely to reflect the society‘s extinction rate3. I will not go
into details on all the different suggestions of these parameter values, but as a
comparison simply refer to Weitzman (2007), whose best informal guess was the
”trio of two‘s”:
ρ = 0.02 + 2 · 0.02 = 6% (2.2)
The balancing of a constant discount rate of 1.4 % which gives a proposed unaccept-
ably high relative weight on the distant future, and a constant discount rate of 6
% which gives a proposed unacceptably low relative weight on the distant future, is
an interesting motivation for exploring alternatives to the s.s. Ramsey equation in
exploring socially efficient discount rates. Still, as I am trying to stress; arguments
for unacceptable relative weights on generations based on mere sentiment, that one
often finds in the literature, hardly suffice for bringing the debate forward. It seems
unlikely that we can expect consensus on a socially efficient discount rate based on
ethical grounds. There may be some extreme parameter values for both δ and θ
that can be ruled out merely based on unacceptable ethical implications, but the
question of how the discount rate should be set remains unanswered.
Less controversial is the Stern Review‘s choice of the δ parameter, describing
impatience as motivated by the extinction rate. Many prominent scholars have
advocated a zero discounting rate of utility when considering intergenerational wel-
fare from a normative point of view. The most famous quote in this regard most
likely belong to Ramsey himself when commenting on the practice of discounting
utility: ”a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises from the weakness of
the imagination”(Ramsey, 1928). This conclusion is followed up by most others
working on this topic. Yet, the literature is most certainly not unanimous. In the
aftermath of the Stern Review, Nordhaus (2007) has probably been the foremost
critic of this ethical view, suggesting a handful other plausible ethical views. The
long tradition of ”agent-relativism”, also suggests that we indeed care more for our
3Such a constant rate implies a Poisson process (memoryless) with probability δdt for extinction
per instant time dt.
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nearest relations and defends it as a legitimate moral point of view. This part of
the debate is commented further in section 2.24.
2.1.1 The Instantaneous Utility Function
In deriving the Ramsey model, we simply assumed iso-elastic utility. This is not
necessarily a good description of people‘s preferences. Using general utility, the s.s.
Ramsey equation becomes
r = δ −
(
c
u′′(c)
u′
)
c˙
c
(2.3)
The power utility function was not randomly picked; it is analytically easy to work
with. An important disadvantage of this assumption, however, is that in steady
state, the level of consumption doesn‘t matter at all for willingness to transfer
consumption between different points of time. Using power utility, the last term of
eq. (2.3) becomes θg in steady state. In equation (2.3) on the other hand, the level
of consumption in general does matter for the interest rate. It has been proposed
that as we get richer, it is plausible that we are willing to save a larger share of our
wealth for the future, implying decreasing elasticity of marginal utility. If this were
constant, and given g, a poor country with a below subsistence consumption level,
and a rich country would be willing to sacrifice equally as much in relative terms
to improve the well-being of future generations. If this is an unacceptable feature,
one could for instance modify the power utility function,
u(c) =
(c−x)1−θ−1
1−θ , θ > 1 (2.4)
where x denotes the subsistence level in the economy. Then we get decreasing
elasticity of marginal utility:
(
c
u′′(c)
u′(c)
)
=
θc
c− x, c > x (2.5)
4In part 3, section 3.4 we will look at the implications of combining the two points of view in
the models of Chichilnisky (1996) and Li and Lo¨fgren (2000).
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It is easy to see that it is decreasing with consumption, and approaches θ in the
limit when consumption goes to infinity:
∂
∂c
θc
c− x =
θ
c− x
(
1− c
c− x
)
< 0, c > x (2.6)
lim
c→∞
(
θc
c− x
)
= θ (2.7)
Usually, the instantaneous utility function describes aversion to inequality in three
dimensions: aversion to inequality across states of nature5, intertemporal inequality
and spatial inequality6. Decreasing marginal utility is often regarded as reasonable
in all three applications, but the magnitude of the relative curvature is not necessar-
ily the same for each application. A person might be willing to bear relatively high
amounts of risk, and at the same time accepting relatively low inequality in con-
sumption over time. In the same line, society‘s valuation of spatial equality might
differ from intertemporal equality. As Weitzman (2007) and Nordhaus (2007) crit-
icize the Stern Review‘s choice of a low parameter of inequality aversion (θ = 1),
Gollier (2006) points out that this is deeply unrealistic with observed aversion to
risk in financial markets. Overall, there is little dispute about reasonable values for
θ when power utility is assumed, at least compared to the absurd dispersion of the
many δ-estimates. Still, it is not clear that θs automatically applies identically for
every dimension, a point stressed by Schelling (1995).
2.1.2 Normative versus Positive Theory
It is commonly held that economists have two important tasks in society: explaining
observed economic behavior (positive or descriptive theory) and deriving rules for
optimal decisions (normative or prescriptive theory). It is a fact that these two
disciplines work together, still; there is a long way between how the world looks
like and how it should look like. The descriptive and prescriptive approaches ask
different questions, and so in general the answers cannot be the same. Observed
5The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is identical to elasticity of marginal utility.
6Spatial inequality, that is inequality across people, is not considered in our model as we have
assumed a single representative consumer. In theory, it is possible to adjust for spatial inequality
in the function describing the ”representative” consumer.
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behavior does not automatically translate into optimal policy rules. There exists,
however, a solid tradition that people‘s preferences should count when deriving
economic policy rules. When an economist or a decision-maker chooses an ethical
value for the society‘s time preference on a normative basis, it does not reflect
anything else than this particular person‘s view of intergenerational distribution.
This is at the heart of Nordhaus‘ (Nordhaus, 2007) critique of Stern. That might
lead us to search for revealed preferences, for instance through the interest rate
markets. This is the equilibrium rate describing people‘s actual choices. Depending
on the extent to which markets are efficient, we might get some answers. The only
problem is that we need to know which question we are asking. Do consumers
reveal ethical values on intergenerational distribution on the social level, when they
make individual consumption planning in short-term markets? It is widely held
that consumers have a positive pure rate of time preference, and on an individual
level, this reflects not only the instinctive impatience as mentioned in section 1.3,
but also that we care more for ourselves, and more for our children than future
grandchildren and so on. Even when individuals have private bequeath motives
for their children, they are not necessarily revealing what they think society as a
whole should leave for the next generation. Sen (1967) proposes a rationale for
this, famously known as the Isolation Paradox. The paradox is that each person
is better off entering a contract that ensures everyone to save more for the future.
But when they act in isolation, total saving for the future will be below what they
collectively desire. The Isolation Paradox seeks to explain a situation of collective
action, where a certain threshold for saving must be achieved; conditioning on the
threshold being reached, it is desirable to save for the future. It is somewhat similar
to the standard equilibrium of a game where everyone benefit from each individual‘s
effort; both situations will require coordination. According to the Isolation Paradox,
no one will benefit when level of saving is below the threshold. So when individuals
act in isolation in the market, they undersave for future generations compared to a
coordinated governmental program. This rationale of Sen is much debated, but it
is still a good example of the friction between descriptive and prescriptive theory.
In the concluding section of Beckerman and Hepburn (2007) the conflict between
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the a priori choice of ethical values and the revealed ethical values of markets is
doomed to continue endlessly, and the authors propose to undertake methods di-
rectly pointed to people‘s preferences, such as ”the use of stated preference surveys,
behavioral experiments and methods to reveal the social preferences inherent in
our social institutions”. These methods have problems of their own, of course. As
controversial and innovative as they may be, they lie in the tradition of cementing
economic policy in people‘s actual preferences.
2.2 The Ethics of Discounting
While future progress on socially efficient discount rates will have its source in eco-
nomic theory, it seems in no way possible to get around the underlying ethics of
the economic models, economic literature or in the concept of long-term discount-
ing itself. When considering the many caveats of assessing the present generation‘s
preferences for future generations‘ welfare, I take the stand that ethical issues de-
serve a great deal of attention. Therefore I will devote a section to review the ethics
separately.
In the intercepting field of philosophy and economics, discounting issues from
an economic point of view is thoroughly explained by Broome (1994). The typical
philosopher‘s question is, as he writes: ”How, they ask, can the mere date at which
a good occurs make any difference of its value?”(Broome, 1994). Ruling out the
practice of discounting utility, the disagreement is more of a misunderstanding in
Broome‘s view. One might get the impression that he believes in consensus on the
ethics of discounting utility. This is not true of course. Zero-discounting of utility
entails utilitarianism, which is much debated as with utilitarianism in economics in
general (Sen et al., 1982). Agent-relative ethics in terms of utility discounting is
discussed in Beckerman and Hepburn (2007). Agent-relative ethics, as they see it,
can be tracked all the way back to the work of David Hume, describing the moral
pattern that agents care more for their closer relations. We care more for our close
family, than our distant, and we care more for fellowing citizens than citizens of
other towns and nations. This is just describing the prevailing moral of course,
2.2. THE ETHICS OF DISCOUNTING 29
not making this line of thinking automatically normative. The authors‘ main point
is that agent-relative ethics is a fair alternative to utilitarianism, and is more in
the line with the moral people actually seem to exhibit. Compared to the Stern
Review‘s argument that we care for our children and grandchildren to the extent
that δ reflects the extinction rate of society, agent-relative ethics is compatible with
utility-discounting to the extent that we care relatively more for our children than
grandchildren and so on.
In the recent literature, Nordhaus (2007) seems to be the strongest critique of
zero utility discounting, while Dasgupta (2005, 2007) clearly criticizes the incon-
sistency between a low δ and low θ, see section 2.2.1. There are several possible
ethical evaluation concepts and Nordhaus (2007) mentions some of them:
 Sustainable development7, which he describes as leaving at least as much
capital as inherited, using a broad definition of societal capital. Sustainable
development is widely known as ”development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).
Arrow et al. (2004) interpret this formally, stating that intertemporal social
welfare must be non-decreasing over time. If Vt is the intertemporal social
welfare function, then the criterion is dVt
dt
≥ 0. As the authors point out,
the criterion will not determine a unique path of consumption, neither will it
ensure the efficient path.
 The perspective of Rawls‘ ”veil of ignorance”, which implies maximizing the
welfare of the poorest generation, is consistent with a very high value of θ.
This means that ex-ante, before we are assigned to a generation, we want to
level the field, by perfectly smoothing consumption across generations and
states of nature, as far as possible. In the discussion of such an ethical view
Dasgupta (2005) states that there would either be no saving, or we would get
intergenerationally inconsistent behavior. If we save, the future generation
7Chichilnisky (1996) shows that the concept of sustainable development is incompatible with
utility discounting.
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will be better off, and this is ruled out by maximizing the welfare of the
poorest. If we care for a finite number of descendants, the plans of dissaving
at some point in the future would be reversed, as the generation at that point
of time cares for a finite number of their descendants. If we care for every
future generations, we would get a sort of a Ramsey model, with or without
utility discounting. Saving would again be zero by maximizing the welfare of
the poorest generation.
 A precautionary principle, which he interprets as maximizing the minimum
consumption along the riskiest path. The precautionary principle states in
most applications, such as innovation with possible negative side-effects, that
when uncertainty about consequences is sufficiently great, one should refrain
from utilizing the innovation. In terms of global warming, this implies taking
huge costs to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and it will be consistent
with maximizing consumption along the riskiest path.
 Considering non-anthropocentric values, such as, intrinsic values derived from
ecology and religion.
Nordhaus (2007) seems to take the position that none of the competing ethical
views actually helps us narrow down an efficient discount rate, but concludes that
opportunity cost of capital is the relevant baseline. The premise for this thesis is
that we can‘t observe the efficient market rate for long horizons, and we will soon
treat the subject of opportunity cost of capital in the long run based on theoretical
models.
2.2.1 Ethical Consistency: δ and θ
As Dasgupta (2007) has argued, a low δ combined with a low θ will put dispro-
portionally high weight on intergenerational equity, compared to intragenerational
equity. Nordhaus argues that θ = 1 is about the lowest plausible value held by
economists. In any way it seems unreasonable to combine low values of both δ and
θ, not only because of its unreasonable implications, but most of all because of the
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paradoxical issues with respect to equality. Zero discounting of utility is a complete
egalitarian view of present and future generations. A low elasticity of marginal
utility is a very inegalitarian view of distribution within a particular generation. So
why should one care more for people in the future than for people in the present
world? This is one of the main points of Schelling (1995), who stresses that the
discounting model of Ramsey‘s legacy is perfectly reasonable for the individual. On
the social level, when considering future generations, he argues that the question
is more of a pure ethical character. Just like aid to poor countries is a political
issue today. Even though the utilitarian view, by decreasing marginal utility, im-
plies transferring vast amounts of goods to countries on lower consumption levels
compared to the western, richer world; this is not what we observe anywhere in
the world today. Schelling (1995) implies that political goals should determine re-
distribution in both present time from rich too poor, and through time from rich
generations to poor generations. This could help determining the amount to invest
for our descendants, still; the most efficient way to choose between redistributional
projects involves determining a socially efficient discount rate.
The duality of the choice of these ethical parameters is pointed out by Dasgupta
(2007): By fixing the growth rate g and the welfare-preserving rate ρ, all combina-
tions of δ and θ that satisfy δ = ρ− θg will give the same value of ρ. Even though
the ethical parameters are conceptually different, different choices could yield the
same result. Both Dasgupta (2007) and Nordhaus (2007) refer to the doctrine of
Koopmans, that we should be careful in making a priori choices for the ethical
parameters δ and θ, since the model is far too complicated to have any feeling to
their implications. Stern‘s and many other scholars‘ choices for parameters in the
long run are nothing less than ethical choices; they are not universally embraced or
necessarily representative and they seem to be inconsistent with actual observations
of behavior.
Part 3
Declining Discount Rates
I have not yet analyzed models treating risk of future consumption growth or inter-
est rates. As we will see, the assumptions about risk and attitudes towards risk are
crucial in determining socially efficient discount rates. Firstly, they might behave
very differently. Secondly, they might be more suitable for real world applications.
As a substitute for using market interest rates, which by assumption fail to incorpo-
rate the valuation effects of long-term risks, properly modelling of risk is a powerful
tool, at least in saying something about the term structure of the discount rate.
Having in mind the academic debate outlined in the previous section, the frame-
work which I will look at is not immune against ethical considerations or the need
to estimate the utility parameters properly. But the models will be much more re-
alistic, and they have the potential to bridge the gap between the ”opportunity cost
view” and the advocates of ”exponential absurdity”, based on economic principles
rather than ethics alone. I start by making clear the distinction between hyperbolic
preferences and declining discount rates. Then I derive necessary conditions for
applying declining discount rates based on macro-risk. The implications for timing
issues is discussed and as we will see, we may be able to reject the usual assumption
of time inconsistency.
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3.1 Hyperbolic Preferences vs. Declining Dis-
count Rates
The concept of hyperbolic discounting is in general not referring to a mathemat-
ical hyperbolic function, but to a discount rate that declines as the future date
becomes more distant relative to the evaluation date. This is not to be confused
with a discount rate that declines due to circumstances related to specific points
of time (Rasmusen, 2008). Hyperbolic discounting has been associated with utility
discounting for decades but in recent times, the concept has entered into the study-
ing of discounting goods as well. The term ”hyperbolic preferences” is still reserved
to utility discounting, δ, which is a form of hyperbolic discounting in the spirit of
Strotz (1955), Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997, 1998).
One could obtain declining discount rates that depend on the length of time1,
or simply because something related to specific dates gives a declining pattern (the
trivial case). In the recent literature, ”declining discount rates” is the common term
used for discount rates depending on the length of time2, even though the term in a
strict sense encompasses all the different types of declining discount rates, including
the trivial case.
The definitions and the uses of them are obviously confusing, but incredibly
important when it comes to possible implications for timing issues. It almost seems
as if there is a need to come up with a new term, defined as ”hyperbolic discounting
of economic goods”. It could solve two problems: the word ”hyperbolic” is by many
scholars associated with utility discounting, and ”declining” fails to differentiate
between trivial and nontrivial cases of declining discount rates.
I will specify ”hyperbolic preferences” for utility discounting. In most cases
when I use the term ”declining discount rates”, I am referring to ”declining” in the
sense that the discount rate declines as the discounted payoff becomes more distant
1As we will see, appropriate assumptions on the stochastic process rationalize such discount
rates.
2Gollier et al. (2008), Pearce et al. (2003), Weitzman (1998, 2001) and many others use this
term in order to describe discount rates declining with the time horizon.
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from today’s point of view. It will be explicitly specified when it refers to a trivially
declining discount rate.
3.1.1 Trivial Cases of Declining Discount Rates
Assume δ is constant, i.e. non-hyperbolic preferences. If we look at the s.s. Ramsey
equation (1.17), there are two reasons for getting declining discount rates in the
absence of risk. One can either believe that the labor-augmenting technology growth
(g) will decline in time, or the utility function could reflect decreasing elasticity of
marginal utility (θ) as in equation (2.4)3. As long as the product (θ · g) is declining
with time, the Ramsey discount rate will as well. These reasons for getting a
declining pattern of discount rates are more of a trivial character. The discount
rates will be declining due to predictable or expected events, and they are not
related to the time horizon itself.
3.2 Introducing Risk in The S.S. Ramsey Equa-
tion
3.2.1 Prudence
Prudence is the idea that the optimal response when the future becomes more
uncertain is to increase saving to be prepared. This section derives the sufficient
condition for prudence. Let us introduce a two-periodic model where the agent is
able transfer income at the sure interest rate. There is no project risk, but the
agent faces risk from uncertain income the next period. As usual, u′(c) > 0 and
u′′(c) < 0. Define m0 as the first period‘s income, s as the savings rate, and m˜t
as the second period‘s stochastic income. We will also use mt, the deterministic
income. Define m˜t = mt(1 + t) where t is a stochastic, mean zero variable. By
accounting relationships, the total consumption the first period is (m0 − s). The
second period consumption is m˜t plus the gross return on savings (m˜t + e
rts). The
3This argument for a declining pattern of discount rates is analyzed by Gollier (2002, 2007).
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constrained optimization problem is
maxsU(s) = u(m0−s) + e−δtE[u(m˜t + erts)] (3.1)
A sum of strictly concave functions is strictly concave, so the first-order condition
is sufficient:
U ′(s) = u′(m0−s)(−1) + e−δtE[u′(m˜t + erts)]ert = 0 (3.2)
Assume there is no risk. Then the first-order condition looks like this:
U ′(s) = u′(m0−s)(−1) + e−δtE[u′(mt + erts)]ert = 0 (3.3)
Now, we introduce the risk. The only change is in the last term in the first-order
condition. If U ′(s) > 0 after introducing risk in mt, then
er−δE[u′(m˜t + erts)] > er−δ[u′(mt + erts)] (3.4)
This is true if, and only if,
E[u′(ct)] > u′(E[ct]) (3.5)
By Jensen‘s inequality, this is true if, and only if, marginal utility is strictly con-
vex. The necessary condition for prudence is that u′′′(c) > 0. This implies that a
socially efficient discount rate in a situation with risk in future income is lower than
compared to the certainty case. The general class of utility functions satisfies the
condition of prudence, except the quadratic utility:
u(c) = ac− bc2 =⇒ u′′′(c) = 0 (3.6)
For the rest of the analysis, I will assume convex marginal utility and the only
specific utility function I will work with is the general power functions:
u(c) =
(c)1−θ−1
1−θ , θ > 1 =⇒ u
′′′(c) = θ(θ + 1)c−(θ+2) > 0 (3.7)
u(c) = ln(c) =⇒ u′′′(c) = 2c−3 > 0 (3.8)
I have now shown that u′′′(c) > 0 is a necessary condition for an optimizing agent
to save more when the future becomes more risky.
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3.2.2 An i.i.d. Stochastic Process
Consistent with the s.s. Ramsey equation (1.17), we now extend the framework of
section 3.2.1 to analyze an independent and identically distributed growth process
of consumption. As a part of this, we need to define the general socially efficient
discount rate function. Without loss of generality, we assume two periods, 0 and t
as in section 3.2.1. The social welfare function is
U = u(c0) + e
−δtE[u(ct)] (3.9)
Assume optimizing agents and frictionless markets. Assume 1 + r is the marginal
rate of transformation between time 0 and t. Equation (3.9) is concave, hence
equation (3.10) is the sufficient condition to solve the consumers‘ problem:
−u′(c0) + e(r−δ)tE[u′(ct)] = 0 (3.10)
Taking logarithms and solving for r gives
rt = δ − 1
t
ln
(
E[u′(ct)]
u′(c0)
)
(3.11)
This is the general socially efficient discount rate function. Compared to the s.s.
Ramsey equation (2.3), the last term now incorporates the effect of prudence in
addition to the effect of decreasing marginal utility. To illustrate this, consider
the case with power utility, t = 1 and assume that the increase in logarithm of
consumption is normally distributed4. Then we get
r = δ + θg − 1
2
θ(θ + 1)σ2 (3.12)
See appendix B.1 for proof.
This is just the s.s. Ramsey equation with an extra term describing the isolated
effect of prudence, which lowers the Ramsey discount rate. In a Ramsey model
equilibrium, the lower market interest rate comes from the fact that consumers
are investing relatively more in productive capital which has decreasing marginal
product. Obviously, the prudence effect increases with the memoryless variance,
4In fact, normal distribution is not that restrictive compared to a general i.i.d. process, because
when time is large enough, the general i.i.d. process approaches a normal distribution.
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and elasticity of marginal utility (θ), which also is interpreted as the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. The higher aversion to inequality, the higher the willingness
to save for the risky future. Observe that relative prudence can be defined in line
with the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion:
P = −c
(
u′′′(c)
u′′(c)
)
= (1 + θ) (3.13)
The more prudent we are, the more willing we are to save for the future. When
marginal utility is not convex (P = 0) the prudence term disappears, even though
we are risk averse.
What is left to do now is to show that an i.i.d. stochastic process implies a
constant discount rate departing from equation (3.11). This is exactly what is
done in a working paper by Gollier (2007). I will focus on the result and intuition
here while a formal illustration of the result is found in appendix B. Define the
consumption growth technology:
ct+1 = cte
x (3.14)
where x is independent and identically distributed each short period of time. Com-
bining these properties with equation (3.11), we end up with a constant discount
rate, without imposing normal distribution:
r = δ − ln (E[e−θx]) (3.15)
This is, of course given power utility and constant pure rate of time preference (δ).
When the growth of consumption is i.i.d., the per periodic risk does not increase with
the time interval. The representative agent faces the exact same risk in each time
period. The variance of log consumption and expected log consumption increase
proportionally with time. This means that the effect of prudence and the effect of
decreasing marginal utility cancel each other out every instant of time, and hence
the term structure of the discount rate is flat5.
5This insight is pointed out in Gollier (2007).
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3.2.3 A Persistent Shock Stochastic Process
There are many stochastic processes which entail persistent shocks to consumption,
but I only show the case of a non mean reversion process. The implications of a
mean reversion process are illustrated in Gollier (2007) and Gollier (unpublished
manuscript). I will not illustrate the mean reversion for two reasons:
1. A mean reversion process will give two effects. The expectation of future
interest rates would be increasing or decreasing due to date-specific events,
depending on the expected movement of the business cycles. This is similar
to the yield curve of market interest rates following a mean reversion process.
The other effect is that increased risk gives a lower long-term discount rate,
compared to an i.i.d. stochastic process. We are mostly interested in this
effect in isolation. Even though a mean reversion process has some degree of
persistence in it, it fails to illustrate our point clearly 6.
2. The calculations are messy and the effect of persistence is not intuitively easy
to show, at least not as efficiently as with the model in this section.
The presentation that follows here is based on own calculations.
We still have the technology of consumption growth as before:
ct+1 = cte
xt (3.16)
Gollier (unpublished manuscript) analyzes the following model:
xt = φxt−1 + (1− φ)µ+ t (3.17)
t ∼ N(0, σ2) (3.18)
φ ∈ (0, 1) (3.19)
We will set φ = 1, and the process will then become purely persistent:
xt = xt−1 + t (3.20)
6In fact, the mean reversion properties work to limit the effects of persistence on long-term
valuation (Gollier, unpublished manuscript).
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t ∼ N(0, σ2) (3.21)
Rewrite eq. (3.16)
ln(ct+1) = ln(ct) + xt (3.22)
By forward induction, we end up with:
ln(ct)− ln(c0) = tx−1 + t0 + (t− 1)1 + (t− 2)2 + · · ·+ t−1 (3.23)
Note that the relative growth rate of consumption g is normally distributed (because
s are) and defined as
g = ln(ct)− ln(c0) (3.24)
Inserting into equation (3.11), and using power utility, we obtain:
rt = δ − 1
t
ln
(
E[e−θ(lnct−lnc0)]
)
(3.25)
This describes the term structure of the socially efficient discount rate. Because the
s are uncorrelated we can write the variance as:
V ar (ln(ct)− ln(c0)) = σ2
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 (3.26)
By using a formula for log-normal distributions (see appendix B.3), we end up with
the (specific) socially efficient discount rate function:
rt = δ + θx−1 − 1
t
0.5θσ2
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 (3.27)
It is easy to see that the socially efficient discount rate is declining, and this is
proven in appendix B.3. It has nothing to do with date-specific events. It is the
length of the time interval that increases the riskiness. This is because of positive
serial correlation of shocks. The annualized risk in log consumption increases with
time when shocks are persistent.
See appendix B.3 for a complete derivation.
3.2.4 Parametric Uncertainty
Another approach to rationalize declining discount rates is based on the realistic
assumption of parametric uncertainty. It is unlikely that we know the parameters
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driving the stochastic process of consumption growth. This is often related to
extreme events happening too rarely to be counted properly in the learning process.
I will not discuss the extent to which we are ignorant about the parameters, but
present a model that leads us to average discount factors rather than discount rates,
based on subjective probabilities. The model is borrowed from Gollier (unpublished
manuscript). Suppose the stochastic process of ct is a function of an unknown
parameter γ. Assume there are n number of possible values for γ, and that we have
subjective probabilities qγ of the value of γ. Then we can write expected utility as:
E[u′(ct)] =
n∑
γ=1
qγE[u
′(ct)|γ] (3.28)
We insert this directly into eq. (3.11):
rt = δ − ln
n∑
γ=1
qγ
E[u′(ct)|γ]
u′(c0)
(3.29)
Then, for a given γ, the efficient discount rate is
rt(γ) = δ − 1
t
ln
E[u′(ct)|γ]
u′(c0)
(3.30)
If eq. (3.29) and (3.30) are put together, we end up with the discount factor
function:
DF (γ, t) = e−rtt =
n∑
γ=1
qγe
−rt(γ)t (3.31)
This function is strictly convex in r, so by Jensen‘s Inequality,
DFt(Eγ[rt]) > Eγ[DFt(rt)] (3.32)
=⇒ rt < Eγ[rt(γ)],∀t > 0 (3.33)
This states that the socially efficient discount rate in general is lower than the
expected interest rate. This result comes from increasing and concave utility com-
bined with parametric uncertainty. But we want to say something more. By the
same assumptions it can be shown that rt as defined by eq. (3.31) has the following
properties:
r0 = Eγ[r0(γ)] (3.34)
drt
dt
< 0 (3.35)
lim
t→∞
rt = min{rt(γ)} (3.36)
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Proof of this is identical to the proof in appendix C.1. The socially efficient discount
rate declines with time, and approaches its lowest value in the limit when time
goes to infinity. This result is obtained by assuming parametric uncertainty and
that leads us to calculate discount rates based on the expected discount factors
conditioning on γ, rather than the expected interest rates. As t gets larger, the
small rt(γ)s become relatively more important in the discount factor.
3.3 The Weitzman-Gollier Approach
In this section, Weitzman‘s argument for declining discount rates is explored. We
present the puzzle that arises from the critique, and a possible solution to solve the
puzzle.
3.3.1 Weitzman‘s Argument
In a series of papers, Weitzman (1998, 2001) (as well as Weitzman (2007)), advo-
cated the idea that when the socially efficient discount rate is uncertain, it isn‘t
discount rates that should be probability-averaged, but rather the discount fac-
tors. The implication of this is that discount rates are declining with time, and in
the limit when t → ∞, denoted as the far-distant future, the lowest possible rate
should be used. Note, as Weitzman (1998) is stressing, that this result relies on the
assumption of a non mean reverting stochastic process for the interest rate. Tech-
nically, he assumes a constant discount rate to be revealed after the decision, while
he points out that the result holds for a mean reverting stochastic process with a
coefficient of reversion that goes towards zero in the limit. Based on the argument
that discount factors should be averaged, given a pure persistent shock stochastic
process he obtains the definition of a socially efficient discount rate RW (t) 7:
RW (t) = −1
t
n∑
i=1
ln
(
pie
−rit) (3.37)
7Note that Weitzman (1998) uses a different notation, but one that is equivalent. The notation
here is the exact notation used in Gollier and Weitzman (2010).
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RW0 =
n∑
j
pjrj = E[r] (3.38)
dRW
dt
< 0 (3.39)
lim
t→∞
RW = min{rj} (3.40)
Proofs of these properties are found in appendix C.3.
Weitzman (2001) gathers numerical opinions on a long-term discount rate from
2,160 PhD-level economists from 48 countries, and he uses the data to estimate
a Gamma-distribution of what the socially efficient discount rate for long-term
applications should be, based on the survey. He landed on the following estimated
interest rate function:
R(t) =
µ
1+ tσ
2
µ
(3.41)
This function has the similar properties as eq. (3.37).
t = 0 =⇒ R(0) = µ (3.42)
dR(t)
dt
= −
(
1 +
tσ2
µ
σ2
)
< 0 (3.43)
lim
t→∞
R(t) = 0 (3.44)
The only difference is that the interest rate goes to zero as t approaches infinity, due
to the particular specification of the discount rate function. The key assumption is
on averaging discount factors rather than rates, and Weitzman (2001)-result may
just be interpreted as a specific form of a declining discount rate function with the
probability distribution estimated from 2,160 professionals. Note, and this is fairly
important, that even though it is not stated explicitly, the assumption of a pure
non mean reverting process is just as important here as it is in Weitzman (1998).
Once the interest rate is revealed it is constant. This can be observed from his
formulation of the discount factor function (Weitzman, 2001):
A(t)
def
=
∫ ∞
0
e−xtf(x)dx (3.45)
For each state, x goes into the discounting function as a constant value for all ts.
In Weitzman (2007), the argument is illustrated in yet another perspective,
where he uses a similar model and argumentation treating project risk. This model
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falls out of the strictly interpreted scope of this thesis, but is briefly illustrated in
section 4.3.
3.3.2 Gollier‘s Critique
In a critique of Weitzman‘s argument, Gollier (2004) pointed out that the NPV-
rule used is inconsistent with the opposite financing strategy based on net forward
value, the NFV-rule. The two criteria are mathematically equivalent, but they entail
complete different implications for risk bearing. Since preferences are not stated in
Weitzman‘s argument, the correct answer to the question is out of the model‘s
reach. It is not about the hypothesis of declining discount rates per se, but rather
on the fact that a different financing strategy turns the argument upside down,
suggesting that the scientific basis of Weitzman (1998) is insufficient in providing
a good story to back up the theory. This point is stressed in Gollier (2004) as he
writes: ”In fact, to tell the truth, I believe that we are both wrong, because our
criteria are arbitrary, as they do not rely on actual preferences.” Before we move to
a presentation of the puzzle solution, let‘s briefly illustrate the different criteria.
Net Forward Value (NFV)-evaluation
Gollier considers a project with a sure gross return Zt in comparison with an in-
vestment yielding the marginal rate of return on capital in the economy. We are
uncertain about the x˜, and Gollier considers the evaluation criterion where risk is
allocated to the future date of payoff. The NFV-criterion is then:
−eR(t)t + Zt ≥ 0 (3.46)
, where R(t) is defined by
eR(t)t = E[ex˜t] (3.47)
This implies that the ”certainty equivalent” discount rate R(t) is increasing with
time. As t becomes larger, the higher values of x˜ become relatively more important8.
8Or you could, as Gollier (2004) does, view E[ex˜t] as an implicit utility function with absolute
degree of risk aversion equal to −t. It is well known that a decrease in absolute risk aversion raises
the certainty equivalent.
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Net Present Value (NPV)-evaluation
Weitzman‘s approach is to evaluate the payoff at present time, in which risk is
allocated:
e−R
W (t)t = E[e−x˜t] (3.48)
and the NPV-criterion advising to undertake the project if, and only if,
Ze−R
W (t)t − 1 ≥ 0 (3.49)
The same intuition as with the NFV-rule applies with opposite sign. The larger the
t, the more relative weight is attached to the smaller values of x˜.
The NFV-rule and the NPV-rule should yield the same policy advices if the
model is right. This is not happening here and that is why Gollier criticizes the
story of Weitzman and asks for building models that rely on preferences.
3.3.3 The Puzzle Solution
There are several proposals for solving the Weitzman-Gollier Puzzle, including
Buchholz and Schumacher (2008) and Hepburn and Groom (2007)9, but here I
will focus on the solution proposed by the very authors from which the puzzle orig-
inated, as presented in the conciliatory paper of Gollier and Weitzman (2010). I
attempt to explain the main insight here.
The solution relies on the agent´s preferences and trivially the result of Weitz-
man holds if the agent‘s utility is ln(c). This is because optimal consumption at
time zero is independent of the interest rate10. Then a NPV-rule can be applied,
as opposed to a NFV-rule. In order to solve the puzzle in general, Gollier and
Weitzman (2010) show that in the context of expected utility, the NPV-rule and
NFV-rule equate perfectly when using risk-adjusted probabilities.
9These two approaches are similar in the sense that the puzzle is resolved in favor of a declining
pattern of discount rates. Buchholz and Schumacher (2008) rely on a proper modelling of risk
aversion, while Hepburn and Groom (2007) study the evaluation date more closely.
10It is a well-known property of logarithmic utility that the substitution effect is exactly offset
by the wealth effect.
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Consider the three different dates: 0∗ is the time when a decision must be made,
and right after comes time 0, the date at which the true, permanent interest rate
is revealed. At last, time t is the date at which the payoff is received. At time 0∗
we have probabilities ps of the interest rate rs, where
∑
s ps = 1.
In line with the previous section, define Z as the present value of the required
capital to undertake the investment, and  as the future value of a sure payoff to
be received at time t.
Before an investment opportunity comes along, the agent is presumed to make
state-contingent optimal consumption plans. To show this, consider a standard
intertemporal framework similar to the one derived in part 1:
V (C) =
∞∑
t=0
e−δtU(Ct) (3.50)
The Inada conditions on U(C) combined with δ > 0, will insure a bounded solution.
For the purpose of this exercise think of a general function:
V (C) = intertemporal welfare (3.51)
We are mainly interested in how the optimal rule looks like, and not so much in
how the intertemporal welfare function V (C) looks like.
If we assume that the underlying production function is linear, we get constant
state-contingent interest rates independent of the level of investment. Consistent
with the risk-free Ramsey model presented in part 1, the consumer now makes
optimal state-contingent plans11:
∂V (Cs∗)
∂C0
=
∂V (Cs∗)
∂Ct
erst,∀t (3.52)
, where rs is the state-dependent interest rate.
Relying on departing from optimum, we can use the Envelope Theorem12 to
derive the following evaluation criterion: It is optimal to undertake the project if,
and only if expected gain in intertemporal welfare is higher than expected loss in
intertemporal welfare:

n∑
s=1
ps
∂V (C∗s )
∂Ct
≥ Z
n∑
s=1
ps
∂V (C∗s )
∂C0
(3.53)
11We assume that the transversality condition holds.
12If we start out with optimal plans, the initial consumption plans will not change on the margin.
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The Weitzman Approach
Weitzman would want to express the criterion using expected marginal intertem-
poral welfare at time 0. Substituting for ∂V (C
∗
s )
∂Ct
from eq. (3.52) into eq. (3.53) we
end up with

n∑
s=1
qWs e
−rst ≥ Z (3.54)
, where
qWs
def
=
ps
∂V (C∗s )
∂C0∑n
s=1 ps
∂V (C∗s )
∂C0
(3.55)
This expression goes into the usual Weitzman discount rate function:
RW (t) = −1
t
ln
(
n∑
s=1
qWs e
−rst
)
(3.56)
This should be familiar. It is similar to eq. (3.37) except that we now are using
risk-adjusted probabilities. The difference is in how the utility function is used to
price the different states by adjusting the probabilities.
The Gollier Approach
Gollier would like to evaluate the payoff at date t, so he would want to substitute
∂V (C∗s )
∂C0
from eq. (3.52) into eq. (3.53). Then we end up with:
 ≥ Z
n∑
s=1
qGs e
rst (3.57)
,where
qGs
def
=
ps
∂V (C∗s )
∂Ct∑n
s=1 ps
∂C∗s
∂Ct
(3.58)
In line with Gollier (2004), the discount rate function can now be written as:
RG(t) =
1
t
ln
(
n∑
s=1
qGs e
rst
)
(3.59)
This is also familiar and RG is similar to the discount rate defined by eq. (3.47),
except that probabilities are adjusted in order to price the different states efficiently.
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The Properties
RW (t) = RG(t),∀t (3.60)
These discount rate functions are quantitatively and qualitatively equal, so let‘s
denote this unique function as RWG. It can be shown that RWG has the same
properties (1-3) as eq. (3.37) (Weitzman, 1998).
RWG0 =
n∑
j
pjrj = E[r] (3.61)
dRWG
dt
< 0 (3.62)
lim
t→∞
RWG = min{rj} (3.63)
We now see that using a framework where preferences are defined and the agent
makes optimal decisions, the qualitative result of Weitzman (1998) holds and we
get declining discount rates. The new, risk-adjusted probabilities come from a type
of no-arbitrage condition in an economy where agents behave optimally. In fact, the
term ”no-arbitrage” here is slightly misleading. We are not dealing with arbitrage
per se, rather we are speaking of arbitrage between present and future selves. If
NFV- and NPV-evaluation do not give the same valuation, the agent will be better
off simply by changing the financing strategy.
3.4 Approaches Concerning Pure Rate of Time
Preference
As part 2 shows, there is some controversy in exponential discounting for its neg-
ligence of future generations. A too low or a zero discount rate place too much
weight on the future, and it is inefficient in the short and medium run.
The literature on intergenerational equity is simply about the balancing of two
conflicting considerations: the present generations‘ welfare versus the future gen-
erations‘ welfare. This ethical view could be represented by a declining utility
discounting rate, δt, as I interpret the combined work of Chichilnisky (1996) and Li
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and Lo¨fgren (2000). In a paper on sustainable development, Chichilnisky (1996) for-
mulated this conflict formally in two axioms, which together require no dictatorship
of the present generation over the future generation, and vice versa. Chichilnisky
(1996) finds that none of the conventional optimality criteria satisfies the stated
axioms. If we take the discounted utility model, exponential discounting entails
dictatorship of the present. Zero discounting on the other hand, will give an un-
bounded solution, and a likely implication is the dictatorship of the future. By
combining these two considerations, a sustainable path is attainable. That is, ap-
plying a positive utility discount rate and adding a term with the long run average
of the sequence of utilities:
W = e−δtU(Ct) + Φ(U(C)) (3.64)
Li and Lo¨fgren (2000) show that this approach applied for renewable resources,
such as productive capital, implies declining discount rates. This would be a kind
of discount rate function reflecting preferences for equal treatment of different gen-
erations, and this function would be deterministic in time. Hence, it has similar
implications for time inconsistency as hyperbolic preferences13.
Another approach when defending declining pure rate of time preference is to
observe that individual behavior reveals hyperbolic preferences. Frederick et al.
(2002), as an example, suggest that there is some evidence of behavior consistent
with hyperbolic preferences. In their review of ”Recent advances in social discount-
ing”, Pearce et al. (2003) use the assumption that individuals seem to discount
utility hyperbolically as an argument for applying declining discount rates in public
CBA, under the parole that actual preferences should count for policy. However, the
literature is ambiguous in its conclusions on hyperbolic preferences being efficient
in the sense that it will ensure the optimal path for the consumer. One debate is
about the optimality of individuals that discount utility hyperbolically and commit-
ment strategies14, the other is on the link between positive and normative theory
as discussed in section 2.1.2. It is therefore not obvious that the practice of hyper-
13See section 3.5.2 for a discussion of these implications.
14Much treated in the literature inspired by Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Pollak (1968).
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bolic discounting of utility observed among individuals translates into social level
hyperbolic preferences.
3.5 Time Inconsistency
3.5.1 Definition of Time Inconsistency
If an agent‘s optimal actions change with time, assuming no new information is made
available in a strict sense, then we are dealing with time inconsistent behavior. In
such cases, what we plan for will be regrettable due to the passage of time alone.
Time consistency is not in contradiction to behavior that changes optimally in
response to new information, but time consistency requires optimal state-dependent
plans to hold through the passage of time.
3.5.2 Hyperbolic Preferences
This section contains a simple illustration of time inconsistency when pure rate of
time preference, δt declines hyperbolically. This model, which is inspired by Gollier
et al. (2008), is an adapted version of the model that is derived in the next section.
Pure rate of time preference is denoted by δt and the interest rate is for simplicity
assumed to be zero. Total income is m and ct is consumption in period t. Utility is
as usual monotonically increasing and strictly concave. The optimization program
in period 0:
maxc0,c1,c2L0 = u(c0) + u(c1)e
−δ1 + u(c2)e−2δ2 + λ0 (m− c0 − c1 − c2) (3.65)
The first-order condition ensuring optimal bundles of consumption period 0 is:
λ0 = u
′(c0) = u′(c1)e−δ1 = u′(c2)e−2δ2 (3.66)
We denote the resulting optimal bundle as (c∗0, c
∗
1, c
∗
2). In period 1, the optimization
program the agent faces is like this:
maxc1,c2L1 = u(c1) + u(c2)
−δˆ + λ1 ((m− c∗0)− c1 − c2) (3.67)
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The first-order condition ensuring optimal bundles of consumption period 1 is:
λ1 = u
′(c1) = u′(c2)e−δˆ (3.68)
By substituting for u′(c1) in the the first-order condition for period 0, we can
check if the plan is still optimal in period 115:
u′(c2)e−(δˆ−δ1) = u′(c2)e−2δ2 (3.69)
=⇒ δˆ = 2δ2 − δ1 (3.70)
As we can see, the plans made in period 0 will prevail if, and only if, eq. (3.70) holds.
This condition does not rule out the possibility of a declining δt due to date-specific
events, but it rules out hyperbolic preferences. If preferences were hyperbolic, then
δ2 < δ1 and δˆ = δ1, which is in contradiction to the condition of time consistency
as defined by eq. (3.70).
Assume that all information about the present and the future is available to an
agent with hyperbolic preferences. One problem is that the agent could wish to
reverse an investment made in the past or to delay the initiation of a project with
positive NPV. When the planned date of initiation approaches, he could wish to
delay the project further into the future and so on. Such a project would never be
undertaken. This problem is related to the availability of commitment instruments.
A good commitment strategy would ensure that all plans made at the present time
actually will be undertaken.
The other problem is more philosophical: When making optimal plans for the
future, should the present or the future self count? There is at least one example in
which commitment is intertemporally optimal. When a project has positive NPV,
both in present and in future evaluation, and the agent still wishes to delay the
project at each point of time, a commitment to undertake the project would make
the agent better off than never undertaking the project.
15Marginal utility is an injective function of ci. Hence, this approach will suffice for proving
that (c∗1, c
∗
2) still is an optimal bundle.
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3.5.3 Declining Discount Rates
A model from Gollier et al. (2008)
What follows here is a simple illustration from the review on ”Declining Discount
Rates” by Gollier et al. (2008), which shows the condition for time consistent dis-
count rates. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this model is pointed at discount
rates that decline with the the time horizon or the trivial case of declining discount
rates. In this section, I will try to show that Gollier et al. (2008) prove time consis-
tency in the trivial case where discount rates are declining due to expected trends
or specific events of the future.
They introduce a three-periodic deterministic model to illustrate their point.
Define m as present value of total income, ci as consumption period i, and u(ci) as
utility of consumption. Utility is, as usual, monotonically increasing in consumption
and strictly concave. The utility discount rate is δi, and the one-periodic discount
rate for economic goods is ri, for period i (r2 is then the long rate), rˆ is the second
period‘s short rate. The optimization program looks like this:
maxc0,c1,c2L0 = u(c0)+e
−δ1u(c1)+e−2δ2u(c2)+λ0
(
m− c0 − e−r1c1 − e−r2c2
)
(3.71)
By Lagrange, the first-order condition is:
λ0 = u
′(c0) = er1−δ1u′(c1) = e2(r2−δ2)u′(c2) (3.72)
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied. The first-order condi-
tion is then sufficient and will give an optimal bundle of consumption (c∗0, c
∗
1, c
∗
2).
Let us move to the next period‘s optimization program. The initial income minus
the first period consumption has been transfered to period 2, at the first period rate
of return, δ1
maxc1,c2L1 = u(c1) + e
−δ1u(c2) + λ1
(
e−r1(m− c∗0)− c1 − e−rˆc2
)
(3.73)
By Lagrange, the first-order condition is:
λ1 = u
′(c1) = erˆ−δ1u′(c2) (3.74)
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Gollier et al. (2008) state that in order to avoid arbitrage, we must define rˆ =
2r2 − r1. This is a crucial statement, so let us stop at this stage for a moment.
It is easier to see this if we compare the two strategies: 1) investing in a 2 years
project at the long rate, or 2) investing in a 1 year project at the short rate, and
then reinvesting the gross return at the next period‘s 1 year short rate. That is,
e2r2 = er1erˆ (3.75)
Taking logarithms and solving for rˆ gives
rˆ = 2r2 − r1 (3.76)
I will return to this condition later. Now, we check that the bundle (c∗1, c
∗
2) is still
optimal at time t = 1. Substituting for u′(c1) in eq. (3.72) and using eq. (3.76), we
end up with the following equation16:
2(r2 − δ1) = 2(r2 − δ2) (3.77)
As long as δ1 = δ2 holds (non-hyperbolic preferences), eq. (3.77) will hold in general.
This requires further investigation. If the no-arbitrage condition (eq. (3.76))
holds, and discount rates are declining, then rˆ < r2 < r1
17. This condition however,
implies that the interest rate is declining due to an expected or deterministic trend.
That is, the declining pattern is attached to dates, and not the length of the time
interval18. To see this, look at eq. (3.76), and have in mind that our previous models
of declining discount rates entail a flat structure of the expectation of future short
rates; it is increasing risk alone that drives the declining pattern. Eq. (3.76) holds
in period 0, but we will seen from period 1, expect that the short rate of period 2
(rˆ) will equal the short rate of period 1 (r1). If we observe that rˆ = r1, we would
want to change the plans that were made in period 0. And if we change our plans it
16As long as utility is monotonically increasing, marginal utility is a one-to-one (injective)
function of ci. Hence, this approach will suffice for proving that (c
∗
1, c
∗
2) still is an optimal bundle.
17See appendix C.2.
18If δts here for some reason were declining due to date-specific events, which is fully compatible
with non-hyperbolic preferences, we would still obtain the result of time consistency. This is in
the line with the statements of Rasmusen (2008). I have actually shown this in section 3.5.2.
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will be due to new information of the future risk (shorter time horizon means lower
risk).
It follows from the model that the condition for time consistency operates in a
deterministic world. Gollier et al. (2008) point out that the result holds for each
state when operating in a risky world, but this is not explicitly analyzed. In our
models of declining discount rates, the discount rate satisfies the time consistency
condition of Gollier et al. (2008) for each state.
Intuition for Time Consistency
I have been stressing the importance of positive correlation between risk and time
horizon when rationalizing declining discount rates. In expectation, the one-periodic
discount rate will tend to repeat itself, as Table 3 shows. This is not saying that
the models predict time inconsistency, but rather that the passage of time gives us
new information - it changes the risk. When period t becomes period t− 1, the risk
of that date is not as risky as it used to be. A simple illustration follows in Table 3:
Year of payoff 2040 2070 2100 2130
Evaluation year
2011 r = 3,5 % r = 3 % r = 2,5 % r = 2 %
2040 r = 0 % r = 3,5 % r = 3 % r = 2,5 %
2070 - % r = 0 % r = 3,5 % r = 3 %
2100 - % - % r = 0 % r = 3,5 %
Table 3. Expected repetitive pattern of declining discount rates 19
This pattern is not deterministic, but it is how we expect the pattern to evolve seen
from year 2011. The pattern is repetitive simply because risk correlates with length
of time. In the case of hyperbolic preferences, this pattern would be deterministic
and lead to time inconsistency.
One main point is that I am not convinced that the particular model presented
by Gollier et al. (2008), proves the non-existence of time inconsistency when discount
rates decline due to increasing risk in time. I believe such a proof would be helpful
for a clear understanding of why declining discount rates are time consistent, in
19The numerical discount rates are examples of my own imagination.
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spite of the agent‘s tendency to regret initial plans in expectation. Note that such
a concept of regret is equally irrelevant for optimal policies as regretting an ex-ante
optimal insurance contract because the good state was materialized20.
In order to see clearly that declining discount rates is fully compatible with time
consistent behavior, the analogy to expected utility theory is useful. But in such
a framework, the agent will of course expect overinvestment ex-post. This cost is,
however, internalized when decisions are made. It is the optimal level of ”insurance
premium”. Expected utility is maximized, rather than expected consumption. To
see this, consider the Weitzman-Gollier approach:
RW (t) = −1
t
ln
(
n∑
s=1
qWs e
−rst
)
(3.78)
Looking farther into the future from the point of time 0∗ when decision is made
and the true r is yet to be revealed, the expectation of rt does not change, but our
valuation changes with the time interval because of the increasing per-periodic risk.
Thus, our expectation at date 0∗ remains
E0∗ [rt] = r¯, ∀t (3.79)
RW (t) < E0∗ [rt],∀t > 0 (3.80)
3.6 Summary of Declining Discount Rates
3.6.1 Propositions
Based on section 3.2 and 3.3 we are now able to list the conditions for obtaining
declining discount rates based on external factors of risk. For illustrative purposes
we assume that δ is constant, that the expected change in growth E[∆g] is zero,
and that the representative agent has power utility. I will now based on this thesis‘
presentation argue that these are the conditions:
1. Assumptions on preferences: u′(c) >, u′′(c) < 0, u′′′(c) > 0
20This line of reasoning is equivalent to the expected utility theory‘s assumption that the agent
has no orientation of regret.
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2. Assumptions on the stochastic process: a purely persistent shock stochastic
process
3. Assumptions on our degree of knowledge: parametric uncertainty
Proposition 3.1
Condition 1 is a necessary condition to obtain declining discount rates.
I showed in section 3.2.1 that this class of preferences is necessary to induce a motive
to increase investments when the future becomes more risky. Therefore, when
per-periodic risk is increasing with time, prudence is necessary to get a relatively
stronger motive to save between two dates that are more distant.
Proposition 3.2
The assumption of an i.i.d. stochastic process for log consumption or a log-normal
distribution for consumption is sufficient to ensure a constant long-term discount
rate.
As we have seen, this type of risk reduces the discount rate equally for each period.
Prudence is necessary to get a lower discount rate when risk is introduced, but it
does not imply a declining pattern under these assumptions of risk.
Proposition 3.3
Condition 1 and 2 combined are sufficient to ensure declining discount rates.
A non mean reverting persistent shock stochastic process in combination with Con-
dition 1 is sufficient to provide declining discount rates, as both the Weitzman-
Gollier approach of section 3.3 and the model of persistent shock stochastic process
in section 3.2.3 showed us.
Proposition 3.4
Condition 1 and 3 combined are sufficient to ensure declining discount rates.
We have seen in section 3.2.4, that prudence combined with parametric uncertainty
yield declining discount rates. If we add the fact that a mean reversion process with
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parametric uncertainty is itself a non mean reversion process, ((Weitzman, 1998)
and (Gollier and Weitzman, 2010)), it makes a strong case for declining discount
rates, as parametric uncertainty is quite realistic and perhaps more so compared
to a persistent shock stochastic processes21. The Weitzman-Gollier approach relies
heavily on a stochastic process with persistent shocks, and this process to be non
mean reverting. The model of a mean reversion process of Gollier (unpublished
manuscript) exhibits a form of declining discount rates, except for the fact that
the long-term discount rate does not approach the lowest possible interest rate or
zero; it is lower bounded. Relying on a mean reversion process does not ensure
strictly declining discount rates. But in combination with parametric uncertainty
the Weitzman-Gollier approach still holds.
It seems fair to conclude that parametric uncertainty is the strongest case for theo-
retically defending declining discount rates. Firstly, these assumptions also ensure
any persistent shock stochastic process to be non mean reverting, and the Weitzman-
Gollier approach holds in addition to the model of parametric uncertainty. Secondly,
it is likely that parametric uncertainty is a perfectly realistic assumption, at least
for the longer time horizon. It is hard to believe that people 200 years ago were
able to predict the magnitude of economic growth up to this point of time. Today,
our knowledge and understanding of economic growth are much more sophisticated,
of course, and we are equipped with computing power to analyze incredibly large
sets of data. But still, economists are having a hard time predicting even business
cycles and the longer the time horizon, the less do we know about the parameters
governing the stochastic process of our economy.
3.6.2 Discussion of Timing Issues
It is consensus that a declining pure rate of time preference (δ) leads to time in-
consistent behavior. Gollier et al. (2008) attempts to prove formally that time
inconsistency is not a problem when the rationale for declining discount rates is
21The existence of a persistent shock stochastic process is to a large extent an empirical question.
See Gollier et al. (2008) and Newell and Pizer (2003).
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external factors of risk. This proof operates in a deterministic world and is based
on declining discount rates due to date-specific events. It seems as if the authors
behind the proof slightly miss the target.
It is not easy to get a solid grip on the issues of time inconsistency when so-
cially efficient discount rates are declining. Most literature on time inconsistency
are concerned with hyperbolic preferences, and not so much with discounting of
goods. Along with the recent literature, there seems to be some confusion about
the different implications of the different rationales. In the foreword of the book
”Discounting and Intergenerational Equity” (Portney and Weyant, 1999), Robert
M. Solow writes, (referring to both Weitzman‘s argument and to the traditional
hyperbolic preferences argument), that: ”But this suggestion [Declining Discount
Rates] solves one problem by creating another. Unless the discount rate is constant,
the policy path is subject to ‘time inconsistency‘”
Additionally, in the commentary section of Gollier et al. (2008), one of the issues
raised is the need for exploring problems of timing issues when discount rates are
declining.
Gollier et al. (2008) is in stark contrast with the above statements, and is sup-
ported by others. Hyperbolic preferences has received greater attention on social
level discounting, and recently within the context of global climate change mitiga-
tion and intergenerational games 22 Winkler (2009) is perfectly clear on the issue
of time consistency: ”In fact, if declining discount rates stem from uncertainty over
future states of the world there is no issue of time-inconsistency if plans are updated
as soon as better information is available.”
When the motivation to invest for the future is risk or uncertainty that is reduced
when approaching the future, the degree of reversibility becomes important. If
investments were fully reversible or we were freely able to delay projects, there
would be little need to invest for the long-distant future. We would not even be
able to bind capital for the future.
On the other hand, if projects are irreversible or the benefits of a project are
22Alongside with Karp (2005), Winkler (2006, 2009) has continued the tradition of Phelps and
Pollak (1968) with applications in climate change mitigation.
58 PART 3. DECLINING DISCOUNT RATES
time-lagged or endogenous in the delay time23, there might be a potential welfare
gain in planning for the long-distant future. These considerations apply whether we
are using a flat or declining term structure of the discount rates of course. But the
theory in this thesis starts becoming really interesting when considering the latter
category of projects.
23Such as climate change mitigation projects.
Part 4
Conclusion
What follows in section 4.1 is a list of the main insights that have been drawn from
the investigations of this thesis, complemented by a few summarizing remarks in
section 4.2. The last section is not part of the conclusion in a strict sense, but is
intended to point out two important interfaces to the topics I have focused on, and
which could become part of further investigations in the future.
4.1 List of Main Conclusions
1. There is no general consensus that the short-term socially efficient discount
rate is equal to the long-term socially efficient discount rate.
2. Quite the contrary: There is good theoretical evidence that external factors
to the agent tend to give a lower discount rate for the distant future.
3. In an optimality-seeking framework: Reasonable assumptions on preferences
combined with parametric uncertainty or a purely persistent shock stochastic
process driving growth, are sufficient to rationalize discount rates that decline
with the time horizon.
4. Declining discount rates do not imply time inconsistency. This holds as long as
plans are updated to new information or changes in the external environment,
and not merely because time is passing.
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5. If we for some reason rationalize declining discount rates on the basis of hy-
perbolic preferences (one way of reflecting relatively greater care for future
generations), time inconsistency becomes a problem. The research within
commitment strategies and intergenerational games seems important under
the assumption of hyperbolic preferences.
6. The theory of declining discount rates do not give answers to ethical ques-
tions, questions regarding our care for future generations or questions about
the numerical values of the discount rate. Further research on this part is
important in order to operationalize the theory, especially empirical research
on interest rates and the stochastic process of the long-term economy.
4.2 Summarizing Remarks
In this thesis, we have seen how important the legacy of Frank Ramsey is when
analyzing long-term discounting. In the shorter term, the opportunity cost of capital
is an appropriate discount rate as long as it is greater than or equals the social rate
of time preference. In the longer term however, the answer is far less obvious. The
simple intuition of the s.s. Ramsey equation is a good organizing concept in which
to think about intergenerational equity in an optimality-seeking framework. As
discussed in part 2, in the long run, we are not so sure of which utility function
to use, and in the case of power utility, which values for θ that is reasonable.
Furthermore, there is no deep consensus regarding the value of δ. Moreover, there
is the debate of to what extent the intertemporal framework inherited from Ramsey
(1928) is appropriate at all in the long run. After all it assumes that we care for our
descendants in a quite specific way. There is always a matter of subjective opinions
and ethical aspects when determining the present‘s preferences for the future as
well as future consumers‘ preferences. Such information can hardly be revealed or
determined properly.
As we developed the framework of Ramsey to account for risk or uncertainty, we
saw that plausible assumptions on the stochastic process and preferences rationalize
declining discount rates. The distinction between this rationale for a declining
4.3. INTERESTING NEIGHBORING TOPICS 61
pattern and a declining pure rate of time preference δt is important when it comes
to dynamical consistency. While it is clear that a declining δt will result in time
inconsistency, it has been weakly proven that declining discount rates are time-
consistent when the rationale builds on external factors of risk (Gollier et al., 2008),
and I have made an attempt to slightly complement on this.
The total theoretical evidence that the socially efficient discount rate declines
with time is quite overwhelming. For practical purposes however, there is a great
challenge to estimating numerical values. We need to estimate the specific param-
eters of the stochastic process or estimate subjective probabilities in the case of
parametric uncertainty. The theory presented in this thesis focuses on the shape of
the term structure and do not imply any specific level of the discount rate.
When evaluating long-term projects, it seems difficult to reach consensus or
some solid ground for analysis. Still, when considering the alternative which is
giving up on the problem at the look of it, the ongoing research (both theoretical
and empirical) brings us forward into a less uninformed future. And for the comfort
of it: If we judge by the debates on climate change in society in general, there is
some evidence that people are interested in questions about the distant future and
long-term investments.
4.3 Interesting Neighboring Topics
This is a small section in which I briefly comment on two (in my opinion) interesting
neighboring topics, which I have chosen not to include in this thesis in spite of their
special relevance to the theory of long-term socially efficient discounting.
Consumption Smoothing or Insurance Policy?
When looking far into the future the projects evaluated seem to be of greater im-
pact, while short-term policies seem to be of a marginal character. It is not con-
troversial to propose that willingness to consider a project that is profitable in a
longer time horizon, tends to increase with the economic significance of the problem.
The models considered in this thesis are mostly appropriate for evaluating projects
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not aiming to overcome threats of disasters. The qualitative insight though, that
greater risk of macroeconomic conditions increases the valuation of projects, still
holds. This insurance perspective is fundamental in financial theory. If per-periodic
risk increases with time, then we will tend to attach greater economic value on long-
term insurance policies compared to an i.i.d. process. Using a smooth discount rate
function might be inappropriate for long-term projects seeking to avoid the conse-
quences of a disaster, even though the qualitative insight of our models still works in
the same direction. When for instance evaluating global climate change mitigations,
a model considering catastrophic events could prove a better framework for CBA.
In Stern and Treasury (2007), Stern used the threat of a disaster as an argument for
using a low discount rate. Qualitatively it makes sense that we should invest more
to avoid catastrophes. But the method of simply lowering the constant discount
rate is hardly a quantitatively reasonable approach when considering catastrophes.
Intrinsic Project Risks
A discussion of how intrinsic project risks should be treated in a long-term perspec-
tive has not been within the scope of this thesis. However, the work of the different
approaches could potentially be combined, as illustrated in Weitzman (2007). The
argument relies on the public economist‘s version of Weighted Average Cost of
Capital (WACC). Combining the premise that discount factors should be averaged
when there is uncertainty about discount rates, and a framework to incorporate the
intrinsic risks of projects into the discount rate function, he obtains a similar result
as in Weitzman (1998). In a CAPM-model of the economy, the expected return of
a project re is higher than the risk-free rate rf because of the risk premium of sys-
tematic risk. As Weitzman points out, the investment βs are correlation coefficients
applied to discount factors and not discount rates. Define
β = corr(Re, P ) (4.1)
, where Re is the gross return of the economy as a whole, and P is the gross return
on the project to be evaluated. Then an appropriate discount rate is:
r(t) = −1
t
ln
(
βe−r
et + (1− β)e−rf t
)
(4.2)
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This has similar properties to eq. (3.37) concerning risk of future interest rates:
r(0) = βre + (1− β)rf (4.3)
dr(t)
dt
< 0 (4.4)
r(∞) = rf (4.5)
This model does not tell us that incorporating risk of projects reduces the so-
cially efficient discount rate compared to safe projects.
In the very long run there is much uncertainty about the discount rate, as the
reader by now presumably will agree on. There are however, many other aspects
of long run policy evaluation that seem very challenging with respect to valuation,
such as intrinsic project risks. How to make appropriate expectations of a certain
project‘s consumption-equivalent more than hundred years into the future seems
at least as difficult as finding appropriate discount rates. There are most certainly
large uncertainties with respect to the numerator in the NPV-function in the long
run. If there are risks or great uncertainties in the project, this will tend to reduce
the certainty equivalent benefits and increase the certainty-equivalent costs. Both
effects work in the direction of reducing the profitability of the project. If the
uncertainties of the project tends to increase with time, the result of declining
discount rates doesn‘t necessarily imply that a vast number of long-term projects
become profitable.
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Appendix A
Deriving the Ramsey Model
A.1 The Consumers‘ Problem
First, we want to analyze the problem using per capita effective labor units variables
denoted by small letter and a cap. The steady state growth of consumption and
capital will be ˙ˆc =
˙ˆ
k = 0. Define:
dA(t)
dt
= rA(t) + wL(t)− C(t) (A.1)
a˙ =
dA(t)
L(t)
dt
(A.2)
Then, using the chain rule
a˙ =
dA(t)
dt
1
L(t)
−A(t)(L(t))−2dL(t)
dt
(A.3)
=
dA(t)
dt
1
L
−na (A.4)
(A.5)
By (A.1),
a˙ = (rA(t) + wL(t)− C(t)) 1
L(t)
−na (A.6)
=⇒ a˙ = w(t)− c(t)− a(t)(n− r(t)) (A.7)
Define lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
u[c(t)]e−(δ−n)dt (A.8)
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Define v(t) = ”present value shadow price of income”. Then we can set up the
Hamiltonian, which defines, for each t, the present value optimization problem.
H = u[c(t)]e−(δ−n)t + v(t)
(
w(t)− c(t)− a(t)(n− r(t))) (A.9)
The first term is the instantaneous present value of period t consumption, while the
last term in the brackets is the law of income flow multiplied with present value
shadow price; the marginal increase in present value of utility of a marginal increase
of income.
∂H
∂c
= 0
−∂H
∂a
= v˙
 FOC (A.10)
The transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
(v(t) · a(t)) = 0 (A.11)
In this case, the problem in (A.9) is stated in order of the transversality condition
not to be violated for reasonable parameter values. From (A.9) and (A.10):
v = u′(c)e−(δ−n)t (A.12)
v˙ = −(r − n)v (A.13)
Combining these two first-order conditions gives us the Euler equation:
ln(v) = ln(u′(c))− (δ−n)t (A.14)
v˙
v
=
d
dt
(ln(v)) (A.15)
=
u′′(c)
u′(c)
c˙
c
c
−(δ − n) (A.16)
From (A.13),
v˙
v
= −(r − n) (A.17)
=⇒ −(r − n) =
(
u′′(c)
u′(c)
c
)
c˙
c
−(δ − n) (A.18)
Solving for c˙
c
gives the Euler equation:
c˙
c
= (δ − r)1
c
(
u′(c
u′′(c)
)
(A.19)
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Rearranging gives the famous Ramsey equation:
r = δ −
(
c
u′′(c)
u′
)
c˙
c
(A.20)
It is easy to show that in the case of power utility, u(c) =
(
c1−θ−1
1−θ , θ > 1
)
we will
get
Euler equation:
c˙
c
=
1
θ
(r − δ) (A.21)
Ramsey equation: r = δ + θ
c˙
c
(A.22)
A.2 The Firms‘ Problem
To ensure that
˙ˆ
k = 0 in steady state, we assume that technology is labor-augmenting
only. With technology function G(t) = egt, we get
Y (t) = F [K(t), L(t) ·G(t)] = F [K, Lˆ] Divide by Lˆ (A.23)
yˆ = F [
K
Lˆ
, 1] = f(kˆ) made possible by CRS (A.24)
(
yˆ
def
=
Y
Lˆ
kˆ
def
=
K
Lˆ
)
In order to maximize profits we need to differentiate w.r.t. K and L. Define
Y = Lˆ · f(kˆ) and differentiate (A.25)
∂Y
∂K
= Lˆf ′(kˆ)
1
Lˆ
= f ′(k) (A.26)
∂Y
∂L
=
∂Y
∂Lˆ
· dLˆ
dL
(A.27)
=
dLˆ
dL
(
f(kˆ)− Lˆf ′(kˆ)KL−2
)
(A.28)
=⇒ ∂Y
∂L
= egt
(
f(kˆ)− f ′(kˆ)kˆ
)
(A.29)
The firms optimize profit in each period, and markets is assumed to clear. The
profit function:
pi = F [K,L]− rK − wL (A.30)
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Combining (A.30) with (A.26) and (A.29), we get the following first-order condi-
tions:
∂pi
∂K
= 0
f ′(kˆ) = r
 FOC capital (A.31)
∂pi
∂L
= 0
egt
(
f(kˆ)− f ′(kˆ)kˆ
)
= w
 FOC labor (A.32)
A.3 Equilibrium
We assume that the economy is closed, therefore we have a = k, ∀t . Using (A.7),
and substituting a for k we have that
k˙ = w − c− k(n− r) (A.33)
By definition kˆ = ke−gt. Differentiating gives w.r.t t gives egt
(
˙ˆ
k + kˆg
)
If we use
(A.31) and (A.32) and substitute for r and w we get
k˙ = egt
(
˙ˆ
k + kˆg
)
= egt
(
f(kˆ)−kˆf ′(kˆ)
)
−c−k(n− f ′(kˆ)) (A.34)
˙ˆ
k + kˆg =
(
f(kˆ)−kˆf ′(kˆ)
)
−cˆ−kˆ(n− f ′(kˆ)) (A.35)
˙ˆ
k = f(kˆ)− cˆ− kˆ(n+ g) (A.36)
Now all variables are in the form of per effective capita units. Same procedure for
consumption, using (A.21) and (A.31) and the definition cˆ = ce−gt. Differentiating
w.r.t. t gives ˙ˆc = e−gt (c˙− gc). Dividing by cˆ gives
˙ˆc
cˆ
=
c˙
c
− g (A.37)
˙ˆc
cˆ
=
1
θ
(
f ′(kˆ)− δ − θg
)
(A.38)
The last equation is derived using (A.36) and (A.21). Equation (A.36) and (A.38)
determines equilibrium path of capital and consumption, when both firms and con-
sumers optimize. We also need the transversality condition and initial value of
capital to say something about the viable optimal path.
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A.4 The Steady State
For the purpose of this thesis I will simply state by intuition that the transversality
condition rules out the possibility of r < g+n. If this does not hold, the representa-
tive consumer would be able to finance increasing debt through technology process
and population growth only.
We have also simply stated that ˙ˆc =
˙ˆ
k = 0 is the only equilibrium, even though it
can be proven formally. Intuitively, if cˆ were to grow in steady state, the growth
couldn‘t come from technology or population growth, so kˆ must have been negative
and this is ruled out by the transversality condition. If kˆ > 0, the same argument
applies. Optimizing agents and the transversality condition give us ˙ˆc =
˙ˆ
k = 0 in
steady state. Using this in the model gives us steady state. From (A.36) and (A.38)
˙ˆ
k = 0 =⇒ cˆ = f(kˆ)− (g + n)kˆ (A.39)
˙ˆc
cˆ
= 0 =⇒ f ′(kˆ) = δ + θg (A.40)
This equation (A.40) is the steady state Ramsey equation, famously used in debates
on long-term discount rates. From this equation (given Inada conditions) we can
find a value for kˆ and use this value to find a unique value for cˆ.
At last, from the transversality condition, f ′(kˆ) > g + n, we see from (A.39) and
(A.40), that
δ + θg > g + n (A.41)
δ > n+ (1− θ)g (A.42)
The transversality condition rules out the possibility that δ is zero for positive (and
often realistic) values for n, θ and g.
Appendix B
Models of Section 3.2
B.1 When Log-consumption is Normally Distributed
r = δ − 1
t
ln
(
E[u′(ct)]
u′(c0)
)
(B.1)
Define x as the increase in the logarithm of consumption.
x ∼ N(µ, σ2) (B.2)
c1 = c0e
x (B.3)
Using the mathematical formula of log-normal distribution:
E[ex] = eµ+0.5σ
2
(B.4)
Then,
E[c1] = c0e
µ+σ2 (B.5)
ln(E[c1]) = ln(c0) + µ+ 0.5σ
2 (B.6)
Then E[g], the expected growth rate of consumption can be written:
E[g] = ln(
E[c1]
c0
) = ln(E[c1])− ln(c0) = µ+ 0.5σ2 (B.7)
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Power utility is assumed, so u′(c) = c−θ. Using eq. (B.3)
E[u′(c1)] = E[c−θ1 ] (B.8)
= (c0e
x)−θ (B.9)
= c−θ0 e
−θx (B.10)
=⇒ E[u
′(c1)]
u′(c0)
= E[e−θx] (B.11)
Using the mathematical formula for log-normal distributions:
E[e−θx] = e−θ(µ−0.5θσ
2) (B.12)
and equation (B.1):
r = δ − ln(E[e−θx]) (B.13)
= δ + θ(µ− 0.5θσ2) (B.14)
= δ + θµ− 0.5θ2σ2 (B.15)
= δ + θ(µ+ 0.5σ2)− θ0.5σ2 − θ20.5σ2 (B.16)
r = δ + θg − 1
2
θ(θ + 1)σ2 (B.17)
B.2 The General Result of an i.i.d. Stochastic
Process
Define
ct+1 = cte
x (B.18)
where x is i.i.d. This property means that we can write eq. (B.1) like this:
rt = δ − 1
t
ln
(
E[u′(c0
∏t−1
τ=0 e
xτ )]
u′(c0)
)
(B.19)
We use the power utility function, so u′(c) = c−θ. Then,
rt = δ − 1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
ln
(
E[e−θxτ ]
)
(B.20)
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Note that it is the i.i.d. property that enables us to put the logarithm of the product
as a sum of the logarithms of factors. Recognizing that the expectation of xτ is the
same for each τ we can rewrite eq. (B.20) as
rt = δ − ln
(
E[e−θx]
)
(B.21)
B.3 A Persistent Shock Stochastic Process
Define the technology of consumption:
ct+1 = cte
xt (B.22)
Define the stochastic variable:
xt = xt−1 + t (B.23)
t ∼ N(0, σ2) (B.24)
The general efficient discount rate function:
rt = δ − 1
t
ln
(
E[u′(ct)]
u′(c0)
)
(B.25)
Rewrite eq. (B.22)
ln(ct+1) = ln(ct) + xt (B.26)
By forward induction,
ln(c1) = ln(c0) + x0 (B.27)
= ln(c0) + x−1 + 0 (B.28)
ln(c2) = ln(c1) + x1 (B.29)
= ln(c0) + x−1 + 0 + x0 + 1 (B.30)
= ln(c0) + x−1 + 0 + x−1 + 0 + 1 (B.31)
ln(c3) = ln(c0) + x−1 + 0 + x−1 + 0 + x−1 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 2 (B.32)
We end up with:
ln(ct)− ln(c0) = tx−1 + t0 + (t− 1)1 + (t− 2)2 + · · ·+ t−1 (B.33)
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This may be written as
ln(ct)− ln(c0) = tx−1 +
t−1∑
τ=0
(t− τ)τ (B.34)
Since the s are uncorrelated, the variance is:
V ar (ln(ct)− ln(c0)) = σ2
t−1∑
τ=0
(t− τ)2 (B.35)
Note that ln(ct)−ln(c0) is nothing else than g, the relative consumption growth and
it is normal-distributed because the s are. In order to derive the socially efficient
discount rate under the specific assumptions of persistence, we use power utility
and the formula for log-normal distributions in eq. (B.12):
rt = δ − 1
t
ln
(
E[e−θ(ln(ct)−ln(c0))]
)
(B.36)
Using eq. (B.12):
rt = δ − 1
t
ln
(
e−θ(tx−1−0.5θσ
2
∑t−1
τ=0(t−τ)2)
)
(B.37)
This is straightforward rewritten as:
rt = δ + θx−1 − 1
t
0.5θσ2
t−1∑
τ=0
(t− τ)2 (B.38)
We also rewrite the summation operator:
rt = δ + θx−1 − 1
t
0.5θσ2
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 (B.39)
We see that the socially efficient discount rate declines in time by carrying out the
following calculations:
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rt+1 − rt = δ + θx−1 − 1
t+ 1
0.5θσ2
t+1∑
τ=1
τ 2 −
(
δ + θx−1 − 1
t
0.5θσ2
t∑
τ=1
τ 2
)
(B.40)
= 0.5θσ2
(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 − 1
t+ 1
t+1∑
τ=1
τ 2
)
(B.41)
= 0.5θσ2
[
1
t
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 − 1
t+ 1
(
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 + (t+ 1)2
)]
(B.42)
= 0.5θσ2
[
t∑
τ=1
τ 2
(
1
t
− 1
t+ 1
)
− (t+ 1)
]
(B.43)
= 0.5θσ2
[
t∑
τ=1
τ 2
(
1
t(t+ 1)
)
− (t+ 1)
]
(B.44)
= 0.5θσ2
1
t(t+ 1)
(
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 − t(t+ 1)2
)
(B.45)
= 0.5θσ2
1
t(t+ 1)
(
t∑
τ=1
τ 2 −
t∑
τ=1
(t+ 1)2
)
(B.46)
= 0.5θσ2
1
t(t+ 1)
(
t∑
τ=1
[τ 2 − (t+ 1)2]
)
(B.47)
All terms in the last summation are negative, hence the discount rate is declining.
B.4 Parametric Uncertainty
The task here is to use these equations:
rt = δ − ln
n∑
γ=1
qγ
E[u′(ct)|γ]
u′(c0)
(B.48)
rt(γ) = δ − 1
t
ln
E[u′(ct)|γ]
u′(c0)
(B.49)
to show the result of section 3.2.4. For ease of notation we define:
λ =
E[u′(ct)|γ]
u′(c0)
(B.50)
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Then we rearrange, and take exponentials of (B.48):
rt = δ − ln
n∑
γ=1
qγλ (B.51)
−(rt − δ)t = ln
n∑
γ=1
qγλ (B.52)
e−(rt−δ)t =
n∑
γ=1
qγλ (B.53)
We do the same for eq. (B.49):
λ = e−(rt(γ)−δ)t (B.54)
We substitute for λ:
e−(rt−δ)t =
n∑
γ=1
qγ
(
e−(rt(γ)−δ)t
)
(B.55)
Note that δ is constant and independent of γ, hence it disappears from both sides:
e−rtt =
n∑
γ=1
qγe
rt(γ)t (B.56)
Appendix C
Models of Section 3.3 and 3.5
C.1 Weitzman Properties 1-3
Property 1
RW (0) = lim
t→0
RW (t) = lim
t→0
−1
t
ln
(
n∑
i=1
pie
−rit
)
(C.1)
l’Hopital
= lim
t→0
∑n
i=1 ripie
−rit∑n
i=1 pie
−rit (C.2)
=
n∑
i=1
piri (C.3)
because
∑n
i=1 pi = 1.
Property 2
Let k > 1 (constant) be given and introduce the notation e−rit = xi. We compute
the following difference
RW (kt)−RW (t) = − 1
kt
ln(
n∑
i=1
pie
−krit) +
1
t
ln(
n∑
i=1
pie
−rit) (C.4)
=
1
kt
(
k ln(
n∑
i=1
pixi)− ln(
n∑
i=1
pix
k
i )
)
(C.5)
=
1
kt
ln
(
(
∑n
i=1 pixi)
k
(
∑n
i=1 pix
k
i )
)
(C.6)
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We now use Jensen‘s inequality to show that this expression is strictly less than
zero. Then RW (t) will be a strictly decreasing function of t and since KW (t) is
differentiable for all t > 0, this implies that dR
W
dt
< 0 for t > 0.
Jensen‘s inequality can be stated for our purposes in the following way. If ϕ is
a strictly convex function and x1, x2, . . . , xn are numbers in its domain, then
ϕ
(∑
pixi
)
<
∑
piϕ(xi) (C.7)
In our case, ϕ takes the form ϕ(u) = uk. Applying this inequality to (C.6), we
find that the argument of the logarithm is less than one, so the logarithm will be
negative. This gives the desired result.
Property 3
RW (∞) = lim
t→∞
RW (t) = lim
t→∞
−1
t
ln
(
n∑
i=1
pie
−rit
)
(C.8)
l’Hopital
= lim
t→∞
∑n
i=1 ripie
−rit∑n
i=1 pie
−rit (C.9)
= lim
t→∞
∑n
i=1 ripie
−rit
e−min{ri}t∑n
i=1 pie
−rit
e−min{ri}t
(C.10)
= lim
t→∞
∑n
i=1 ripie
−(ri−min{ri})t∑n
i=1 pie
−(ri−min{ri})t (C.11)
= lim
t→∞
min{ri}p1 +
∑n
i=2 ripie
−(ri−min{ri})t
p1 +
∑n
i=2 pie
−(ri−min{ri})t (C.12)
=
min{ri}p1 + 0
p1 + 0
(C.13)
= min{ri} (C.14)
We have assumed in (C.12), without loss of generality, that the term containing
min{ri} has index i = 1.
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C.2 A Model on Time Consistency
C.2.1 First-Order Conditions
I use notation as defined in section 3.5.3. Optimization in the first period:
maxc0,c1,c2L0 = u(c0)+e
−δ1u(c1)+e−2δ2u(c2)+λ0
(
m− c0 − e−r1c1 − e−r2c2
)
(C.15)
∂L
∂c0
= u′(c0)− λ0 = 0 (C.16)
=⇒ λ0 = u′(c0) (C.17)
∂L
∂c1
= e−δ1u′(c1)− λ0e−r1 = 0 (C.18)
=⇒ λ0 = er1−δ1u′(c1) (C.19)
∂L
∂c2
= e−2δ2u′(c2)− λ0e−2r1 = 0 (C.20)
=⇒ λ0 = e2(r2−δ2)u′(c2) (C.21)
Then we end up with the first-order condition:
λ0 = u
′(c0) = er1−δ1u′(c1) = e2(r2−δ2)u′(c2) (C.22)
Optimization program, second period:
maxc1,c2L1 = u(c1) + e
−δ1u(c2) + λ1
(
e−r1(m− c∗1)− c1 − e−rˆc2
)
(C.23)
∂L
∂c1
= u′(c1)− λ1 = 0 (C.24)
=⇒ λ1 = u′(c1) (C.25)
∂L
∂c2
= e−δ1u′(c2)− λ1e−rˆ = 0 (C.26)
=⇒ λ1 = erˆ−δ1u′(c2) (C.27)
Then we end up with the first-order condition:
λ1 = u
′(c1) = erˆ−δ1u′(c2) (C.28)
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C.2.2 Proof of Time Consistency
Substituting for u′(c1) in eq. (C.22) (combining eq. (C.22) and (C.28)), and using
the no-arbitrage condition (rˆ = 2r2 − r1), we obtain:
erˆ−δ1u′(c2)er1−δ1 = u′(c2)e2(r2−δ2) (C.29)
=⇒ erˆ−δ1+r1−δ1 = e2(r2−δ2) (C.30)
=⇒ rˆ − 2δ1 + r1 = 2(r2 − δ2) (C.31)
[2r2 − r1]− 2δ1 + r1 = 2(r2 − δ2) (C.32)
=⇒ 2(r2 − δ1) = 2(r2 − δ2) (C.33)
This equation holds if, and only if, δ1 = δ2.
C.2.3 Inequalities
If the discount rates are declining we know that
r2 < r1 (C.34)
In a deterministic world, or in a stochastic world seen from time 0, no-arbitrage
condition must hold
rˆ = 2r2 − r1 (C.35)
=⇒ rˆ + r1 = 2r2 (C.36)
Since, r1 > r2,
rˆ < r2 < r1 (C.37)
